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Introduction 
The principal agent model as introduced by Coase (1937) and first theoretically analyzed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) is widely used to describe conflicts between the owner of a firm 
and its workers. Among others, two problems which occur in principal agent relations are 
shirking and incomplete contracts. Shirking may occur if the principal cannot perfectly 
observe and control the efforts of the agent. Incomplete contracts are not enforceable. In 
reality almost all contracts are incomplete. The conflicting principal agent relations shine in a 
new light since models of social preferences have been introduced in economic theory. 
Among others, the theories of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004) provide manageable tools to model typical economic situations in a more realistic way. 
These theories of fairness and reciprocity explain the behavior in principal agent relations 
better than the standard theory which relies on the assumptions of egoistic and rational 
individuals. They can explain the functioning of contracts which are not enforceable by 
postulating positive reciprocation of individuals to kindness of other individuals. This leads to 
principal agent relations which can be understood as a kind of gift exchange. The investment 
game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) provides a framework to model such incomplete 
contracts within economic experiments. The first player has to make a risky move, entrusting 
a certain monetary investment to another player. The second player can either keep this 
money which is tripled on its way to his/her, or reciprocate to the gift by sending some of the 
money back to the first player. In contrast to standard theories reciprocity can explain why 
individuals send non-zero amounts to another one even though there is no opportunity to 
enforce a backtransfer. 
This thesis contributes to both above mentioned problems within principal agent relations. 
Two Chapters address a particular question of incomplete contracts, namely the question if 
endogenous leadership in the sense of a voluntary input increases efficiency in an 
environment where the contract is not enforceable, represented by a variation of the above 
described investment game. Another Chapter addresses the question if the principal can 
reduce shirking in team production with the help of contract design. All research hypotheses 
within this thesis are derived from models which assume that individuals act as if they had 
social preferences. The thesis comprises four Chapters; each of them is a working paper and is 
self-contained.  
 1 
Chapter 1 is joint work with Manfred Königstein and Balázs Rozsnyói.1 It introduces an 
experimental game which is a variation of the investment game introduced by Berg et al. 
(1995) where the principal can choose the sequence of the game. This is referred to as 
endogenous leadership. If the principal decides to move first efficiency raises substantially in 
form of high investments and high backtransfers. 
Chapter 2 is also joint work with Manfred Königstein and Balázs Rozsnyói.2 It investigates an 
experimental game which is a variation of the game presented in Chapter 1. Now inequality in 
endowments is introduced within the modified investment game. In this setting inequality 
aversion and reciprocity predict different outcomes of the game. While inequality aversion 
predicts no transfer of the agent, reciprocity predicts transfers of both principal and agent. 
This might be the more realistic situation for principal agent relations. There are no efficiency 
gains of endogenous leadership to be found anymore, while a strong trust and reciprocity 
mechanism is still observed within the data. This indicates that inequality concerns play an 
important role in principal agent relations but positive reciprocation to kind acts still exists 
even though payoff equalizing preferences predict no reciprocity. 
Chapter 3 is joint work with Manfred Königstein, Gabriele Lünser and Balázs Rozsnyói.3 It 
addresses the problem which arises when organizing work in groups is more efficient for 
some workers but also risky for the principal since team production may create shirking 
incentives. An experimental game for a principal agent model where one principal faces 16 
agents is introduced. Eight agents are high productive workers and the other eight agents are 
low productive workers in group tasks. The principal proposes contracts for an individual task 
and a group task in every period. Agents self-select themselves into tasks and provide effort 
either in the individual or in the group task. The group task is modeled as a public good. Thus 
teams are paid equally according to the team output regardless of the effort of one particular 
agent. Effort in the group task increases with the offered wage. Thus a reciprocity mechanism 
can be observed again. High productive agents are more likely to choose group task and 
provide higher efforts. But the sorting mechanism is far from being efficient. Thus, a 
substantial proportion of shirkers is still entering the group task. 
While Chapters 1, 2 and 3 address particular experimental games, Chapter 4 addresses a 
framework to estimate parameters of utility functions which are assumed to generate the 
1  All authors contributed equally. 
2  All authors contributed equally. 
3  All authors contributed equally. 
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observed data of experiments. While analyzing data from decisions of individuals the question 
arises which structural model to use in order to estimate parameters. The most common 
procedure in experimental economics is to estimate a linear model. This seems sensible since 
linear approximations are often useful and easy to handle. However, they consequently ignore 
both the structure of the data (which are often discrete in experimental economics) and the 
data generating process, namely the individual considerations which lead to the observed 
behavior. An alternative way to estimate parameters from decisions of individuals is to use the 
framework of the logit equilibrium model introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). 
The logit equilibrium model is a flexible framework for estimating parameters of arbitrary 
utility functions. Further, it is compatible with the familiar logit model which arises from a 
random utility model for discrete choice. Thus it seems to overcome both shortcomings of the 
linear models. Chapter 4 presents a logit equilibrium model for a three stage two player 
ultimatum game with advance production. In a first stage both players simultaneously decide 
upon their effort to a joint production. On the second stage one player proposes a split of the 
joint return and on the third stage the other player either accepts or rejects the proposed split. 
The game is analyzed within the framework of a logit error model and parameters of the 
utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as of a standard utility function 
with egoistic payoff maximizing preferences are estimated with maximum likelihood 
methods. The estimated results suggests that the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility model 
explains the data better than standard theory. 
  
 3 
1. Voluntary Leadership in an Experimental Trust Game 
1.1 Introduction 
The trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) represents a basic two person conflict in 
which players may choose cooperative moves sequentially to achieve a mutually beneficial 
outcome. The first mover (trustor) chooses an investment which induces a return that accrues 
to the second mover (trustee). The second mover then can backtransfer money to the first 
mover but may also decide to keep the return for himself/herself. The first mover cannot use a 
court to enforce a payback of the initial investment or a part of the surplus in addition to 
investment. He/she may, however, trust that the second mover will reciprocate the given 
“gift”. 
Without trust there will be no surplus in this game. But if there is trust, and if higher 
investment leads to higher backtransfer, we refer to this as the “Trust-And-Reciprocity” 
mechanism.4 Such a positive correlation between investment and backtransfer has been 
shown in many experimental studies including the seminal study by Berg et al. (1995). It is 
also documented in a recent meta-analysis by Johnson and Mislin (2011). From a pure 
rationalistic viewpoint this result is surprising: An egoistic and rational second mover should 
not backtransfer any money, and therefore the first mover should not invest in the first place. 
But the result is not surprising from everyday experience, which tells us that sequential gift 
exchange is common in social interaction. Despite this everyday experience it is interesting to 
study the forces that strengthen or weaken the Trust-And-Reciprocity mechanism. Camerer 
(2003) describes how several structural and individual factors, like e.g. stake size and 
nationality, influence behavior in trust games. Johnson and Mislin (2011)5 investigate cultural 
differences in trust games. In addition to empirical studies, theoretical models have been 
developed that might explain Trust-And-Reciprocity within a wider rationality framework 
(see e.g. the social preference models of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006)). 
Our study contributes to the research on trust games by investigating the influence of 
voluntary leadership. Voluntary leadership means that one of the two players can decide 
4  Reciprocity in experimental labour markets is reported e.g. in Gächter and Fehr (2002). 
5  Furthermore see the related studies on gift exchange experiments by Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk et al. 
(1999), Fehr et al. (1997), Fehr et al. (1993, 1998) as well as Gächter and Falk (2001). 
 4 
                                                 
whether to be first mover or second mover in the trust game. In natural relationships it is quite 
usual that the sequencing of moves is not predetermined. The mere fact that one player takes 
the “burden of the first move” in such a situation (we call this an “endogenous trust game”) 
could make a difference compared to a situation, where the order of moves is predetermined. 
In an endogenous trust game the order of moves may be open in the sense that either player 
may volunteer to make the first move. But one may also think of situations where one player 
has the right to determine the order of moves. In a hierarchical relationship, like the principal-
agent relationship of an employer and a worker, it might be the employer’s choice whether to 
make the first move himself/herself or whether to pass this to the employee. E.g., the 
employer may decide to pay the employee ex-ante or ex-post. Payment ex-ante is risky, 
requires trust, and may induce reciprocity from the employee. Payment ex-post is safe, but 
may not be as beneficial for the principal if the agent no longer reciprocates by giving back 
more than what is necessary to get the job done. 6 
We present a lab experiment on an endogenous trust game in which one player (the principal) 
may decide to leave the investment choice to the agent or to take the investment decision 
himself/herself. In the latter case we refer to this as “voluntary leadership”. The game differs 
from the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) with respect to the second mover’s choice of 
backtransfer. In our game the second mover may choose an amount between zero and 10 and 
the amount is tripled and paid to the first mover. Accordingly, the game is symmetric in the 
sense that first mover and second mover face the same choice sets whereas choice sets are 
asymmetric in the trust game of Berg et al. (1995). We chose this variant of trust game since 
we are interested in the influence of voluntary leadership in an otherwise symmetric situation.  
We find that voluntary leadership increases investment and increases backtransfer of the 
second mover compared to the alternative sequencing in which the agent is investor. 
Furthermore investment and backtransfer are higher under voluntary leadership than in the 
control treatment with exogenously determined sequencing. Lastly, we show that risk 
preference and inequality aversion as modeled formally by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) influence 
behavior in the endogenous trust game. The observed effect sizes are economically 
substantial. 
In Section 1.2 we summarize the related literature. In Section 1.3 we describe our 
experimental game and provide a theoretical analysis. In addition to a benchmark theoretical 
6  We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this illustrative example. 
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solution based on standard preferences we analyze the game assuming inequality aversion and 
risk preferences. The analyses lead to a set of empirical hypotheses. Section 1.4 describes 
experimental procedures, and Section 1.5 provides data analyses and empirical results. 
Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Related Literature 
To our knowledge this is the first study on endogenous sequencing in trust games. Gächter 
and Renner (2005), Güth et al. (2007), Kumru and Vesterlund (2010) are related studies 
which consider a leader’s choice in public good experiments. They report increased contributions 
and efficiency gains compared to simultaneous public good games due to high first mover 
contribution. In these studies leadership is not voluntary but predetermined by the experimenter. 
There are only a few studies on endogenous leadership in the experimental literature7. Closest 
to our design are the studies of Arbak and Villeval (2013) and Rivas and Sutter (2011). Arbak 
and Villeval (2013) investigate a public good experiment with endogenous leadership. On the 
first stage one group member can contribute voluntarily while other group members 
contribute simultaneously after observing the contribution of the leader. A substantial number 
of subjects (about one out of four) are willing to act as leader. These first movers contribute 
significantly more to the public good compared to the contributions in simultaneous public 
good games. As a result second movers’ contributions are rising. First movers earn less than 
second movers but voluntary leadership induces efficiency gains. Rivas and Sutter (2011) 
study several forms of leadership in public good games and compare exogenously enforced 
leadership and endogenous (voluntary) leadership. They also find higher contributions to the 
public good under endogenous leadership. 
Our study contributes to both the literature on trust games – by making the sequencing of 
decisions a player’s choice – and the literature on leadership in public good games – by 
reducing the number of players on which the success of the leader hinges. In our game the 
leader’s payoff hinges on the decision of a single player, the second mover. Compared to a 
public good game the leader might find this more risky. Furthermore, the trust signal implied 
7  Fonseca et al. (2006a, 2006b) and Huck et al. (2002) study duopoly games with endogenous timing. Firms can 
choose their quantities in one of two periods. Potters et al. (2005) study a public good game with endogenous 
sequencing when some donors do not know the value of the public good. Nosenzo and Sefton (2011) study a 
public good game with endogenous move structure. Players can choose their contribution in one of two 
periods. Furthermore players receive different returns from the public good. 
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by voluntary leadership might have a different value in a two player trust game than in a 
public good game. 
1.3 Experimental Game and Theoretical Predictions 
1.3.1 The Trust Game with Endogenous Leadership and Symmetric Endowments 
Consider a principal-agent game between two players, player P (principal) and player A (agent), 
which are both initially endowed with 10 money units. The game comprises three stages: 
Stage 1: P decides upon the sequencing of moves in the trust game that follows in 
stages 2 and 3. P has two options, sequence “P-First” or sequence “A-First”, 
with the meaning that in case of P-First (see stages 2.a and 3.a) the trust 
game is played with P being investor (first mover) and A being trustee 
(second mover) and vice versa in case of A-First (see stages 2.b and 3.b).  
If P-First: 
Stage 2.a: P decides upon investment { }10,...,1,0∈px ; then A receives the amount px3 . 
Stage 3.a: A decides upon backtransfer { }10,...,1,0∈ay ; then P receives the amount ay3 . 
If A-First: 
Stage 2.b: A decides upon investment { }10,...,1,0∈ax ; then P receives the amount ax3 . 
Stage 3.b: P decides upon backtransfer { }10,...,1,0∈py ; then A receives the amount py3 . 
Payoffs are determined as follows:  
app yx 310 +−=π  and paa xy 310 +−=π  
(if P-First) 
or  
app xy 310 +−=π  and paa yx 310 +−=π  
(if A-First) 
This concludes the description of the game. If P chooses P-First we refer to this as the 
principal’s choice of “voluntary leadership”. The game theoretic solution with egoistic and 
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rational players – i.e. our benchmark solution – is straightforward. In stage 3 the trustee has 
no incentive to backtransfer money, therefore the backtransfer will be zero. Consequently, it 
does not pay to invest in the first place, so investment will be zero. Anticipating this outcome 
player P is indifferent with respect to the sequencing of moves. Thus, the game theoretic 
solution with rational, payoff-maximizing players predicts that each player keeps the 10 
money units, foregoing a potential efficient payoff of 30 for each if investment and 
backtransfer were maximal. 
Stages 2 and 3 are similar to the trust game of Berg et al. (1995). In our game investments and 
backtransfers are tripled whereas in Berg et al. (1995) only investments were tripled. 
Furthermore, in our case the strategy space for backtransfers is fixed – the numbers zero to 10 
– whereas in Berg et al. (1995) it is endogenous – from zero up to three times the investment. 
Thus, our trust game is symmetric whereas the game by Berg et al. (1995) is asymmetric. We 
chose this design since we wanted to investigate the influence of voluntary leadership in an 
otherwise symmetric game. Our design allows the second mover to return money even if the 
first mover’s investment is zero. We actually find that some participants do so. 
We know from many experiments on these games that contrary to the benchmark solution 
players do cooperate: Players trust in the second mover (the trustee) by choosing positive 
investment levels, and trustees reciprocate by choosing positive backtransfers. If investment 
and backtransfer are positively correlated we interpret this to be a Trust-And-Reciprocity 
mechanism. 
Our experiment is designed to investigate whether the Trust-And-Reciprocity mechanism is 
influenced by voluntary leadership – i.e. a player’s choice of the first mover position in the 
trust game. We expect the following influences: 
Hypothesis 1.1: If the principal chooses to be leader (voluntary leadership), then 
investment (Hyp. 1.1.A) and backtransfer (Hyp. 1.1.B) are higher than if the principal 
forces the agent to be first mover in the trust game. 
Our main research hypothesis is motivated as follows: In our trust game being first mover is a 
more risky position than being second mover. Thus, if P chooses to be leader, he/she exposes 
himself/herself to higher risk. Therefore we consider this to be a strong signal of trust in 
addition to the subsequent choice of investment. Player A reciprocates P’s trust by higher 
backtransfer – i.e. we predict higher backtransfer controlling for investment. To control for 
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investment one may consider e.g. the backtransfer rate (backtransfer divided by investment) 
or backtransfer minus investment. If P anticipates a higher backtransfer rate due to voluntary 
leadership, incentives for investment are higher and consequently we predict higher 
investment. These arguments are intuitive but they are inconsistent with the benchmark 
solution of the game. In the next Section we rely on more formal considerations of social 
preferences and risk aversion to motivate our hypotheses. 
1.3.2 Social Preferences and Risk Preferences 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, henceforth FS) proposed a model of inequality averse players that 
can be applied to analyze our experimental game. It can explain cooperation in trust games 
which is an empirical regularity that has been reported in many studies. Therefore the FS 
model is more suitable than the standard model of egoistic and rational individuals. The FS 
model also provides a formal framework for arguing about individual player characteristics. 
Individual characteristics are potentially important in our empirical analyses, since they might 
moderate our main hypothesis (Hyp. 1.1). According to FS an inequality averse player 
maximizes the following utility function (we refer to this as FS-preferences): 
{ } { }0,max
1
10,max
1
1
ij
ji
jji
ji
jjj nn
U ππβππαπ −
−
−−
−
−= ∑∑
≠≠
 
with restrictions 10 <≤ jβ  and jj βα ≥ . The variables jπ  and iπ  represent monetary 
payoffs of players j and i while the parameter jα  ( jβ ) represents the degree of aversion 
against unfavorable (favorable) inequality. In Appendix A we provide a theoretical analysis of 
the trust game with endogenous leadership assuming FS-preferences and common knowledge 
of preference parameters. The following proposition can be shown to hold:  
Proposition 1.1: If the trustee (second mover in the trust game) is sufficiently 
inequality averse 4/1≥jβ  there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) with 
maximal investment and maximal backtransfer and with player P choosing sequence P-
First (voluntary leadership). 
Intuitively, since the trustee can always avoid unfavorable inequality, the backtransfer 
depends only on preference parameter jβ . Depending on jβ  the trustee will either 
reciprocate positive investment 0>ix  by choosing ij xy =  or will choose 0=jy . Then, if
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ij xy =  is anticipated by the investor (player i), maximal investment ix  is rational even for 
egoistic players ( 0== ii βα ). If the principal knows that the agent is sufficiently inequality 
averse he/she may choose to be investor. Alternatively, there also exists an SPE with maximal 
investment, maximal backtransfer and the sequence A-First. Furthermore, the benchmark 
solution (zero investment, zero backtransfer, any sequence) is also a SPE if inequality 
aversion is sufficiently low. Thus, under complete information we can establish cooperative 
equilibria and voluntary leadership.  
If the preference parameters are not commonly known as it is the case in an experiment, 
investment is risky. The investor does not know the trustee’s parameter jβ  and cannot be 
sure about the backtransfer. If 10=ix  is chosen, the expected utility of a risk neutral investor 
is  
)40))((1(30)()( ii probprobUE αββ −−+=
−−
 
with )(β
−
prob  representing the investors subjective belief about the trustee being sufficiently 
inequality averse to choose 10=jy . Since )( iUE  is increasing in )(β
−
prob  and decreasing in 
iα  investment is more likely if the investor is more optimistic about the trustee being 
inequality averse, and investment is less likely if the investor is more averse against 
unfavorable inequality. Consequently, the principal’s willingness to take voluntary leadership 
should also increase in )(β
−
prob  and decrease in iα .  
In addition one may wonder about the investor’s attitude toward risk. If investment is zero, 
backtransfer will be zero as well, so the investor will keep the endowment of 10 for sure. 
With positive investment the payoff will be either larger or smaller than 10. Therefore a larger 
degree of risk aversion reduces incentives to invest and the principal’s willingness to take 
voluntary leadership. With respect to the backtransfer one may argue that risk aversion does 
not matter, since the trustee is sure about the consequences of his/her choice. However, if the 
trustee acknowledges that the investor had to bear more financial risk, an inequality averse 
player may consider it fair to compensate the investor for taking the risk (see Hypothesis 
1.1). Note that in this paragraph we argue only partially along the FS model, since the FS 
model does not incorporate risk aversion. Furthermore in our experiment we do not expect 
equilibrium behavior to occur necessarily. However, we find it instructive to derive 
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qualitative predictions for investment and backtransfer based on FS-preferences and concern 
for risk. Furthermore individual player characteristics may influence observable behavior and 
therefore should be controlled for in the assessment of Hypothesis 1.1. Therefore we 
summarize our theoretical arguments in the following empirical hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.2: Investment is smaller if the investor is more risk averse (Hyp. 1.2.A), 
he/she exhibits a stronger aversion against unfavorable inequality (Hyp. 1.2.B), and if 
he/she has a lower subjective belief of an inequality averse trustee (Hyp. 1.2.C). 
Hypothesis 1.3: Backtransfer is increasing in the trustee’s degree of favorable 
inequality aversion. 
1.3.3 Control Treatment: Trust Game with Exogenous Leadership 
To investigate the influence of voluntary leadership (Hypothesis 1.1) we run experimental 
sessions on the trust game with endogenous leadership and compare behavior under both 
sequences (P-First versus A-First). As explained above we interpret the choice of voluntary 
leadership as a signal of trust that leads to stronger reciprocation (higher backtransfer rate) 
than if the principal does not take leadership (and thus assigns the agent to be first mover in 
the trust game). A subtle question arising here is whether it is the choice of voluntary 
leadership that is perceived as a signal of trust or whether it is the refusal of voluntary 
leadership that is perceived as a signal of distrust or non-cooperative attitude. In the latter case 
an agent who is mandated to make the first move might choose low investment leading to low 
backtransfer. To discriminate the possibility of such a distrust-effect from the proposed trust-
effect we ran a control treatment on a trust game with exogenous leadership. It is equivalent to 
the stages 2.a and 3.a of the trust game with endogenous leadership as described above (again 
with an endowment of 10 and payoff functions as above). The trust-effect should increase 
investment and backtransfer compared to the control treatment, while the distrust-effect 
should lower investment and backtransfer compared to the control treatment. 
1.4 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was run in the experimental economics lab at the University of Erfurt. It 
comprised 10 sessions with groups of 20 participants each, and it was computerized using the 
software z-Tree (see Fischbacher 2007). The participants were students from different fields 
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(social sciences and humanities) and recruited via Orsee (Greiner 2004). Each participant 
played only a single game, so the experiment was truly one-shot. Players received written 
instructions, were randomly paired and interacted anonymously (instructions are provided in 
Appendix B). The trust game with endogenous leadership was applied in eight sessions, and 
the control treatment (exogenous leadership) was applied in two sessions. We ran more 
sessions on the endogenous treatment to collect enough observations on voluntary leadership. 
Namely, we anticipated correctly that voluntary leadership is more often refused rather than 
chosen. 
After playing the trust game the participants played the lottery game of Holt and Laury (2002) 
to determine their degree of risk aversion and played the distribution game of Danneberg et al. 
(2007) to determine their FS-preference parameters iα  and iβ . The collection of both, the 
degree of risk aversion and the FS-parameters, were incentivized. We will use these measures 
to test Hypotheses 1.2.A, 1.2.B and 1.3. Details on these procedures are provided in the 
Appendix B. We also collected a measure of an individual’s trust in other persons or society 
as a whole as it is collected by the World Value Survey (2005).8 This measure may serve as a 
proxy for an investor’s subjective belief of a reciprocal choice of the trustee and will serve to 
test Hypothesis 1.2.C. The participants also filled in the 16-PA-personality questionnaire of 
Brandstätter (1988) and provided some socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, etc.) 
to allow for additional individual control measures. Thus, all in all we have a number of 
incentivized and non-incentivized measures. The experimental procedures are summarized in  
Table 1.1. Sessions took about 50 minutes, subjects were paid anonymously, and average 
earnings were about 10 EUR.9 
Table 1.1: Overview of Experimental Procedures 
Treatment Sequence of Games Observations 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
1. Trust Game with Endogenous Leadership 
2. Holt/Laury Game, Danneberg et. al. Game 
3. Trust Question, 16-PA and Socio-Demographic Questionnaire 
8 Sessions 
80 Pairs 
160 Participants 
Exogenous 
Leadership 
1. Trust Game With Exogenous Leadership 
2. Holt/Laury Game, Danneberg et. al. Game 
3. Trust Question, 16-PA and Socio-Demographic Questionnaire 
2 Sessions 
20 Pairs 
40 Participants 
8  The question is: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people? Participants may answer “yes” or “no”. 
9  An average earning for a student job at the time of the experiment was about eight euro per hour.  
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1.5 Empirical Results 
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Simple Analyses 
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 provide summary statistics of experimental decisions. Accordingly, in 
the trust game with endogenous leadership most principals decide for the sequencing A-First. 
However, 16 out of 80 principals (20%) choose voluntary leadership (P-First). 
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics (Means) 
Treatment Investment 
x 
Backtransfer 
y 
Backtransfer 
Rate y/x 
# Obs. 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
P-First 
(Vol. Leadership) 
9.13 
(1.50) 
8.06 
(2.70) 
0.89 
(0.26) 16 
A-First 6.83 (3.09) 
5.19 
(3.09) 
0.88 
(0.64) 64 
Exogenous Leadership 5.40 (2.76) 
4.10 
(3.09) 
0.94 
(0.86) 20 
Notes: Table 1.2 includes means and standard deviations of investment, backtransfer and backtransfer rate by 
treatment. 
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics (Medians) 
Treatment Investment 
x 
Backtransfer 
y 
Backtransfer 
Rate y/x 
# Obs. 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
P-First 
(Vol. Leadership) 
10.0 
(2.0) 
9.0 
(3.0) 
1.00 
(0.17) 16 
A-First 
7.5 
(5.75) 
5.0 
(4.75) 
1.00 
(0.50) 
64 
Exogenous Leadership 5.0 (5.0) 
3.0 
(4.0) 
0.67 
(0.57) 20 
Notes: Table 1.3 includes medians and interquartile range of investment, backtransfer and backtransfer rate by 
treatment. 
Investment and backtransfer is higher in P-First than in A-First giving a first indication of 
support for Hypothesis 1.1. Means of investment and backtransfer are higher in the two 
endogenous leadership conditions than under exogenous leadership. Variances are relatively 
large, so we also look at medians. Table 1.3 confirms that median investments and median 
backtransfers are higher under endogenous leadership than exogenous leadership. According 
to pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests in Table 1.4 the differences in investment are highly 
statistically significant for the comparison of P-First versus A-First and P-First versus 
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Exogenous Leadership. Differences between A-First and Exogenous Leadership are only 
significant at a 10% level. 
Table 1.4: Pairwise Mann-Whitney U Tests of Investment by Treatments 
P-First versus A-First  p = 0.005, N = 80 
P-First versus Exogenous Leadership p < 0.001, N = 36 
A-First versus Exogenous Leadership p = 0.057, N = 84 
Notes: P-values are calculated for two-tailed tests. 
Figure 1.1 is a scatterplot of backtransfer against investment. It illustrates the joint 
distribution of backtransfers and investments, and it clearly indicates a positive correlation. 
Different dot sizes represent clustering of observations. The reference lines represent a 
quadratic regression of backtransfer on investment with a 95%-confidence band. Obviously, 
agents behave reciprocally, responding larger backtransfer for larger investment. The 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between backtransfer and investment is positive and 
highly statistically significant (ρ = 0.449, p < 0.001, N = 100) giving robust support for the 
Trust-And-Reciprocity mechanism. 
Figure 1.1: Scatterplot of Backtransfer over Investment 
 
Notes: Different dot sizes represent clustering of observations. Quadratic regression line and 95%-confidence 
band included as well as reference lines for “backtransfer equal to investment” and “backtransfer sufficient to 
compensate investment”. 
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1.5.2 Regression Analyses of Investment 
To investigate our hypotheses further we apply regression analyses controlling for the influence 
of social preferences, risk attitudes, personality characteristics, and other factors. Since Figure 
1.1 also shows relatively large dispersion and that there is some clustering at the upper bound 
of the decision interval, we don’t rely on OLS-regressions but apply Median regressions and 
Tobit regressions analyses. Table 1.5 shows the results of different model specifications for 
regressions of investment. Table 1.6 shows analogous analyses of the backtransfer. 
Table 1.5: Regression Results of Regressions on Investment 
Dependent Variable: Investment, Base Category is P-First Exogenous 
 Model 1-Median Regression Model 2-Tobit Regression 
Variable Coefficient P-Value  (Two-Tailed) Coefficient 
P-Value  
(Two-Tailed) 
A-First Endogenous 
1.223 
(0.802) 
0.131 
0.925 
(0.932) 
0.323 
P-First Endogenous 
3.513 
(1.039) 
0.001 
5.785 
(1.391) 
< 0.001 
Alpha 
-1.097 
(0.466) 
0.021 
-1.276 
(0.545) 
0.021 
Alpha Missing 
-1.487 
(0.851) 
0.084 
-1.776 
(0.966) 
0.069 
Risk Aversion 
-1.600 
(0.669) 
0.019 
-2.239 
(0.798) 
0.006 
Risk Missing 
-2.291 
(1.209) 
0.061 
-2.957 
(1.488) 
0.050 
Male 
1.513 
(0.687) 
0.030 
2.495 
(0.842) 
0.004 
Constant 
7.264 
(0.860) 
< 0.001 
7.734 
(1.002) 
< 0.001 
Number of Observations 100 100 
Pseudo R² 0.292 0.105 
Notes: Table 1.5 includes regression results for investment as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 contain 
coefficients and two-tailed p-values of the Median regression. Columns 4 and 5 contain coefficients and two-
tailed p-values of the Tobit regression. Standard errors are included in parentheses. 
Model (1) in Table 1.5 reports the result of a Median regression of investment. Overall the 
model fits well showing a pseudo R2 of 0.292. P-First and A-First are 0-1-dummies for the 
two endogenous leadership conditions. Both coefficients are positive confirming higher 
investment compared to the reference category (exogenous leadership). But only the 
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coefficient of P-First is significantly different from zero. Testing the effect of P-First against 
A-First shows also a significant difference (p = 0.012) supporting Hypothesis 1.1.A. 
In line with Hypotheses 1.2.A and 1.2.B investment decreases in Risk Aversion and 
unfavorable inequality aversion (Alpha).10 Both effects are statistically significant. The 
variables Alpha-Missing and Risk Missing are nuisance variables coded as 1 (and otherwise 0) 
if a participant did not provide a consistent measure of α (21 out of 100 cases) or a missing 
measure of risk aversion (eight observations). We included these variables in order not to 
confuse effects of the variables of interest (Alpha and Risk Aversion). Male participants 
(dummy variable Male) invest more than female. The reported model was received as the 
final model after eliminating insignificant regressors from a larger model that contained the 
trust measure of the world value survey and the five 16-PA factors. 
Model (2) is a Tobit regression using the same variables as model (1) and assuming a lower 
bound of zero and an upper bound of 10 for the dependent variable. It might be considered as 
a natural alternative for model specification, but it is less robust against outliers. The Tobit 
model qualitatively confirms model (1). All estimated coefficients show the same sign, but 
significance values differ. While the Median regression model seems more adequate in our 
view, we will use the Tobit model later on for computing mean effect sizes. 
1.5.3 Regression Analyses of Backtransfer 
Model (3) in Table 1.6 is a Median regression of backtransfer. The model fits well overall 
(pseudo R2 = 0.240). As we predicted backtransfer is increasing in investment. This effect is 
highly significant (p < 0.001). Furthermore, backtransfer is higher under voluntary leadership 
(P-First) than under exogenous leadership (the reference category). Testing the coefficient of 
P-First against the coefficient of A-First shows also a highly significant difference 
(p = 0.074). These estimation results clearly support our main hypothesis (Hyp. 1.1.B). 
Counter to Hypothesis 1.3 the trustee’s degree of favorable inequality aversion (Beta) has no 
significant effect even though the direction of influence is as predicted by the FS model.11 The 
reported model was received as the final model after eliminating insignificant regressors from 
10 The variable Risk Aversion contains the Holt/Laury measure and a value of zero if the Holt/Laury measure is 
missing. Similarly, the variable Alpha contains the Danneberg et al. measure and a value of zero in case of an 
inconsistent Danneberg et al. measure. 
11 The variable Beta contains the Danneberg et al. measure and a value of zero in case of an inconsistent 
Danneberg et al. measure. Beta_Missing is a dummy variable representing observations with inconsistent 
measures of β . 
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a larger model that contained gender, the trust measure of the world value survey and the five 
16-PA factors in addition to the variables in the final model. Though the effect of Beta is 
insignificant we decided to report this model since Beta is a key variable in our analysis of the 
FS model.12 
Table 1.6: Regression Results of Regressions on Backtransfer 
Dependent Variable: Backtransfer, Base Category is P-First Exogenous 
 Model 3 – Median Regression Model 4 – Tobit Regression 
Variable Coefficient P-Value  (Two-Tailed) Coefficient 
P-Value  
(Two-Tailed) 
Investment 
0.667 
(0.092) 
< 0.001 
0.564 
(0.132) 
< 0.001 
A-First Endogenous 
1.333 
(0.687) 
0.055 
0.287 
(0.969) 
0.767 
P-First Endogenous 
2.667 
(0.930) 
0.005 
2.826 
(1.343) 
0.038 
Beta 
1.212 
(1.027) 
0.241 
2.064 
(1.456) 
0.160 
Beta_Missing 
0.036 
(0.676) 
0.957 
0.693 
(0.996) 
0.488 
Constant 
-0.370 
(0.788) 
0.640 
0.600 
(1.128) 
0.596 
Number of Observations 100 100 
Pseudo R² 0.240 0.070 
Notes: Table 1.6 includes regression results for backtransfer as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 contain 
coefficients and two-tailed p-values of the Median regression. Columns 4 and 5 contain coefficients and two-
tailed p-values of the Tobit regression. Standard errors are included in parentheses. 
Model (4) shows a Tobit regression with upper bounds zero and 10 and using the same set of 
predictor variables. All effects show the same signs as in the Median regression, but 
significance results differ. Again, while the Tobit regression is less robust we rely on it for 
computing effect sizes. 
1.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Voluntary leadership (P-First Endogenous) leads to higher investment in our trust game 
experiment compared to both A-First Endogenous and the treatment with exogenous 
12 If we estimate in an alternative model specification (not reported) the effect of Beta for large levels of Beta 
(the upper quartile level) we find a significant effect. 
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sequencing. The influence is shown as highly statistically significant in a Median regression 
analysis. Computing mean effect sizes we find that the predicted investment is 9.61 under 
voluntary leadership (P-First) compared to 7.39 under A-First and 6.69 in the reference 
category P-First Exogenous.13 Thus, the effect of voluntary leadership on investment is not 
only statistically significant but also economically substantial (Hyp. 1.1A). We also find 
support for the second part of our main hypothesis: Backtransfer is higher under voluntary 
leadership than when the agent is forced to make the first move (Hyp. 1.1.B). Mean effect 
sizes predicted by the Tobit regression model are 7.24 for P-First Endogenous and 
respectively 5.21 for A-First Endogenous and 4.97 for Exogenous Leadership.14 Again, 
voluntary leadership has an economically substantial effect. 
We reproduce the finding of a positive correlation of investment and backtransfer that has 
been observed in other versions of trust games (see e.g. the meta-study of Johnson and Mislin 
2011). This effect, the Trust-And-Reciprocity mechanism, is highly statistically significant.15 
Voluntary leadership adds to this finding. Since we control for investment in the regression 
analysis, we find the influence of voluntary leadership on top of the correlation between 
investment and backtransfer. 
As predicted, investment decreases in risk aversion and unfavorable inequality aversion (Hyp. 
1.2.A and 1.2.B). It is larger for male than female. Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Houser et al. 
(2010) relied on the Holt/Laury measure of risk aversion in studying trust games as well. Both 
studies report only a weak influence of risk attitudes. Thus, we add to this literature by 
evidence in support of a correlation between investment and risk attitudes.16 Counter to 
Hypothesis 1.3 backtransfer does not correlate significantly with favorable inequality 
aversion (Beta) even though the effect points into the predicted direction (higher Beta leads to 
13 We use the Tobit regression model to compute predicted values. Alpha, Risk Aversion and Male are set to mean 
values. Alpha Missing and Risk Missing are set to zero. The computations respect the truncation at zero and 
10. If we compute effect sizes based on the linear index of the Tobit model (not reported), effect sizes are even 
larger. 
14 These are predicted values computed conditional on an investment level fixed at 7, a mean value of Beta and 
for Beta Missing = 0. 
15 Pillutla et al. (2003) report that the relationship between investment and backtransfer in the standard trust 
game (see Berg et al.) is nonlinear with backtransfer being relatively larger for maximal investment rather than 
intermediate investment levels. In our case here Figure 1.1 suggests, however, that backtransfer is concave in 
investment. Adding squared investment as regressor in model (3) (not reported) results in a negative but 
insignificant coefficient. 
16 Supporting evidence is also provided by Kosfeld et al. (2005). They show in a neuroeconomic study on a trust 
game variant that oxytocin increases the willingness to bear social risks. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) 
investigate whether playing a binary-choice trust game is equivalent to taking a risky bet and show that the 
trust game is perceived as more risky. 
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higher backtransfer). These findings show that individual characteristics of players modify 
behavior in our trust game. 
Analyzing the game under FS-preferences proved useful in deriving empirical predictions, 
e.g. by allowing for positive investments and backtransfers. In principle, it allows to consider 
individual characteristics of players via individual preference parameters. And, one might 
consider extending the model to allow for inequality aversion, risk aversion and incomplete 
information with respect to the other player’s preferences at the same time. In this case one 
could possibly derive voluntary leadership formally as a trust signal, if this decision provides 
information about the unknown player type. However, to our knowledge this has not been 
done so far, and it would be beyond the scope of our study.17. 
While we were mainly interested in investment and backtransfer conditional on the choice of 
voluntary leadership one might also be interested in that choice itself. So one might ask: What 
drives the choice of voluntary leadership? – An answer to this question would also be relevant 
to understand the choices of investment and backtransfer. For instance, if the decision to lead 
implies self-selection on risk types, this would explain higher investment under voluntary 
leadership. We can use our data on individual characteristics to investigate whether the choice 
of voluntary leadership is correlated with certain player types. To do this we ran Logit 
regression (not reported) with the choice of P-First Endogenous (versus A-First Endogenous) 
as dependent variable and regressors Risk Aversion, Alpha, Beta, gender, the trust measure of 
the world value survey and the five 16-PA factors. However, none of these variables showed a 
significant influence. 
Thus, our data do not explain the choice to lead. But we offer some thoughts on the 
psychology the decision to lead. We think informally of voluntary leadership as a signal of 
trust, like in the standard version of the Berg et al. (1995) game, where the choice of 
investment by the first mover is interpreted as “trust choice”. If the principal decides to lead 
and to take the investment choice himself/herself this induces stronger reciprocation by the 
second mover. This psychological interpretation (of voluntary leadership as a trust signal) is 
speculative, since one may offer other explanations. For example, the principal may decide to 
lead in order to avoid a negative signal (if forcing the agent to lead is seen as signaling a non-
cooperative attitude). This explanation, however, can be ruled out on the basis of our data, 
17 In addition there are other models of social preferences that might offer additional insight e.g. the intention-
based models of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) or the outcome-based 
model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). 
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since investment is not significantly lower under A-First Endogenous than under Exogenous 
Leadership. Rather, investment under A-First Endogenous is insignificantly larger than under 
exogenous sequencing. 
Yet another alternative reason for the principal to take the lead may be that he/she expects the 
agent to be more risk-averse. To investigate this possibility one may run further experiments 
in the future in which one collects data on the principal’s expectations regarding the agent’s 
choice of backtransfer. 
Interestingly, backtransfer (conditional on investment) is higher under both conditions, P-
First Endogenous and A-First Endogenous than under Exogenous Leadership. In the former 
case it is the agent who chooses backtransfer, and the agent might want to compensate the 
principal for putting himself/herself at risk. In the latter case (A-First Endogenous) it is the 
principal who chooses backtransfer, and he/she might want to compensate the agent for 
having been put at risk by himself/herself. Psychologically, these are different reasons for 
increased backtransfers. So there is room for more experiments on endogenous trust games in 
the future. 
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2. Endogenous Leadership in an Experiment on the Investment 
Game with Heterogeneous Agents 
2.1 Introduction 
The trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) is widely used to model principal agent 
relations in experimental economics. The game consists of two players one of them called 
trustor and the other one called trustee. In the first stage the trustor decides which part of 
his/her endowment he/she wants to transfer to the trustee. On its way to the trustee the 
invested amount is multiplied by a factor larger than one (typically three). In stage two the 
trustee can send an arbitrary amount of what he/she wants to give back to the trustor. 
Meanwhile the rational selfish trustor will choose to send nothing back to the trustee and 
rather keeps the whole endowment for him/her. He/she prefers to maximize the joint payoff 
and will invest the full endowment. However the trustor is at the risk of being exploited by the 
trustee. 
The endogenous trust game introduced by Kleine et al. (2013) is a modification of the trust 
game by Berg et al. (1995) with respect to two aspects. Firstly, not only the investment but 
also the backtransfer is tripled. Secondly, one of the players decides about the sequence of the 
game. Kleine et al. (2013) refer to this as endogenous leadership. They find substantial 
efficiency gains if one player endogenously decides to move first. In order to disentangle the 
fairness motives inequality aversion and positive reciprocity we want to modify this game by 
introducing inequality in endowments. This was done before in a similar way by Xiao and 
Bicchieri (2010). They introduce inequality in endowments in a trust game where the 
sequence is predetermined exogenously. We want to check if the strengthened trust reciprocity 
mechanism which is reported in Kleine et al. (2013) also holds if the players are 
asymmetrically endowed. 
We think that inequality in endowments is a natural assumption for principal agent relations in 
practice. It is hard to believe that in real life principals and agents are equally endowed. In a 
more realistic setting the principal should be better off than the agent. Thus, Xiao and 
Bicchieri’s (2010) as well as our design models real principal agent relations better than the 
standard trust game as proposed by Berg et al. (1995). 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we review the related literature. Section 2.3 
presents the model of the game and derives our research hypothesis. After that in Section 2.4 
we describe the experimental procedures. Section 2.5 presents and analyzes the data. In 
Section 2.6 we summarize and discuss the results, respectively. 
2.2 Related Literature 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on endogenous sequencing in trust games 
with asymmetric endowed players. The related literature can be divided in two strands, one on 
trust games with asymmetric endowments and one on endogenous leadership. 
As mentioned above Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) introduced a variation of the trust game where 
players are endowed asymmetrically. They use a mechanism to introduce inequality in 
endowments which is very similar to ours. In their game the sequence is given exogenously, 
and the trustor’s endowment is set to ensure that both players are paid equally, if the investor 
sends the maximal amount to the trustee. Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) restricted the strategies of 
both players. The investor could decide between zero or 10 and the trustee can respond either 
zero or any multiples of five. They find a decline in positive reciprocity when reciprocation 
increases inequality in payoffs. 
Endogenous leadership in experimental economics has been studied by Arbak and Villeval 
(2013) as well as by Rivas and Sutter (2011). They keep their focus on endogenous leadership 
in public good games. Both studies found positive effects of endogenous leadership. Kleine et 
al. (2013) introduced a modified trust game with endogenous leadership. The main results of 
the studies are that a considerable number of players decide to move first, the endogenous 
leaders invest amounts near to the upper bound of the strategy space, endogenous leadership 
is rewarded with comparable high back transfers and the decision to move first endogenously 
strongly increases efficiency. 
Our new trust game with endogenous leadership wants to check if the introduction of 
inequality in endowments reduces the positive effects of endogenous leadership found by 
Kleine et al. (2013). 
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2.3 Experimental Game and Theoretical Predictions 
2.3.1 The Trust Game with Endogenous Leadership 
The game has exactly the same structure as the game of Kleine et al. (2013). For that reason 
the following description is taken from there: 
“Consider a principal-agent game between two players, player P (principal) and player A 
(agent), which are both initially endowed with 10 money units. The game comprises three 
stages: 
Stage 1: P decides upon the sequencing of moves in the trust game that follows in 
stages 2 and 3. P has two options, sequence “P-First” or sequence “A-First”, 
with the meaning that in case of P-First (see stages 2.a and 3.a) the trust 
game is played with P being investor (first mover) and A being trustee 
(second mover) and vice versa in case of A-First (see stages 2.b and 3.b).  
If P-First: 
Stage 2.a: P decides upon investment { }10,...,1,0∈px ; then A receives the amount px3 . 
Stage 3.a: A decides upon backtransfer { }10,...,1,0∈ay ; then P receives the amount ay3 . 
If A-First: 
Stage 2.b: A decides upon investment { }10,...,1,0∈ax ; then P receives the amount ax3 . 
Stage 3.b: P decides upon backtransfer { }10,...,1,0∈py ; then A receives the amount py3 .” 
However the payoff function is different. Payoffs are determined as follows:  
app yx 350 +−=π  and paa xy 310 +−=π  
(if P-First) 
or  
app xy 350 +−=π  and paa yx 310 +−=π  
(if A-First) 
This concludes the description of the game.  
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While both players are endowed with 10 experimental currency units (ECU) in Kleine et al. 
(2013), we endow player P (the trustor) with 50 ECU and the trustee (player A) only with 10 
ECU. Thereby we introduce a conflict between different fairness motives, namely inequality 
aversion and reciprocity. Both players can transfer an amount between zero and 10 ECU. If 
player P transfers the maximum possible amount of 10 ECU both players’ payoffs will be 
equal. Thus, player A has no incentive to transfer any amount back since this would decrease 
utility of inequality averse players as brought forward by Fehr & Schmidt (1999). If one 
player decides to invest a positive amount in standard trust games both inequality aversion 
and positive reciprocity predict positive backtransfer. Now, in our game with unequal 
endowments, the inequality aversion of player A would predict a transfer of zero, but at the 
same time positive reciprocity explains a positive transfer of player A. Furthermore we are 
interested in the strength of the signal which came from endogenous leadership. Kleine et al. 
(2013) already show that endogenous leadership causes high investments as well as high 
backtransfers. We want to check whether this holds under the condition of inequality in 
endowments. 
To test the effects of reciprocity and inequality aversion we controlled the game described 
above with several other treatments. First we ran sessions where the sequence of moves was 
given exogenously. For that reason the control treatment only consists out of two stages (2.a, 
3.a), where P invests and A transfers back. We want to refer to this treatment as P-First 
Exogenous. This treatment allows us to observe the effect of voluntary leadership, if we 
compare it with the situation P-First-Endogenous, because in both situations the better 
endowed player P invests first. Furthermore we hold all parameters, payoff multiplicators and 
instructions constant to the game of Kleine et al. (2013). Therefore we are able to compare 
our new results with the results of endogenous leadership with symmetric endowed players. 
This enables us to observe the effects of inequality in endowments. 
2.3.2 Research Hypotheses 
It is straightforward to show that the game theoretic solution with egoistic preferences 
predicts zero investment and zero backtransfer in trust games. This holds because at the 
second stage the trustee has no incentive to transfer back anything. Since the investor 
anticipates that he/she has also no incentive to invest positive amounts. As a result we can say 
that both players will hold on to their initial endowments and choose the inefficient solution. 
 24 
On the other hand, models of social preferences predict investments and backtransfers that are 
different from zero. Among the proposed theoretical models of social preferences we will first 
rely on the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999, henceforth FS).18 The FS 
model for two players i and j is given by the following utility function: 
 
with restrictions  and . The variables  and  represent monetary 
payoffs of players j and i while the parameter ( ) represents the degree of aversion 
against unfavorable (favorable) inequality. Appendix A contains the proofs of the following 
two propositions that we derive from the FS model.  
Proposition 2.1: Regardless of the degree of inequality aversion of player A and the 
sequence chosen by P player A’s transfer is zero. 
It is easy to show that this does not depend on the inequality aversion of player A, if he or she 
transfers positive amounts. A positive transfer of player A always increases inequality since it 
increases the payoff of P and simultaneously decreases the payoff of player A. Thus, it has to 
decrease A’s utility according to the FS model. This holds for both possible sequences, 
because the transfer decision of player P is independent from the amount transferred by player 
A, even if player A has to move first which is shown by the following Proposition. 
Proposition 2.2: If player P (the better endowed player) is sufficiently inequality averse (𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 > 1 4⁄ ) the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a full transfer of player P. Player 
A’s transfer is zero and player P is indifferent about the sequence. 
The FS model predicts two possible outcomes of the game, one with equal payoffs and one 
with unequal payoffs amounting to the respective endowments of the player A and P. 
Consequently the FS model predicts zero transfer of player A and depending on his or her 
inequality aversion zero or full transfer of player P. 
18 See e.g. the intention-based models of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) 
or the outcome-based models of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
{ } { }0,max0,max ijjjijjjU ππβππαπ −−−−=
10 <≤ jβ jj βα ≥ jπ iπ
jα jβ
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While the FS model makes point predictions, the predictions of the intention based theories of 
reciprocity19 are more differentiated. The theory of reciprocity by Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004, henceforth DK) suggests the following utility function for player k:20 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘(𝑓𝑓) =  𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘(𝑓𝑓) + 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 
Where f is a particular end node of the game, 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘(𝑓𝑓) is the payoff of player k in this particular 
end node f and 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is an individual parameter of player k, which represents the degree of 
reciprocity of player k to player l. If player k does not reciprocate it is zero and the utility of 
the end node is simply the payoff. Otherwise the utility is enlarged by the second term of the 
right hand side of the equation. This is the product of two terms: the reciprocity term of player 
k, 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘, and the kindness term of player l, 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘. The kindness term is the difference of the actual 
payoff and the so called equitable payoff. The equitable payoff 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 is simply the mean of the 
highest possible payoff 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘ℎ and the lowest possible payoff 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  of player k. It is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘
𝑒𝑒 = 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘ℎ+𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑙𝑙
2
. 
The kindness term 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 measures player k’s experienced kindness resulting from player j’s move 
and is given by 
𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 = 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 − 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒. 
The reciprocation term 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 measures the kindness of player k to player l and is defined 
symmetrically to the perceived kindness of player k. 
In our game the kindness term is positive if the first mover invests more than three money 
units to the second mover.21 The following proposition can be shown to hold and the proof is 
attached to Appendix A. 
Proposition 2.3: If one of the players invests an amount xl > 3, then the backtransfer of 
the other player is also positive if 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 > Δ𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙.22 
19 Three popular models are proposed by Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006). 
20 We now call both player k and l to distinct between the other notations. This is necessary because in the terms 
of the DK model both players are symmetric since their asymmetric endowment has no impact for the 
predictions in this model. Thus, we use the notation 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃), 𝑙𝑙 ∈ (𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃)  ∧  𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑙𝑙. 
21 See Appendix A. 
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This means that there is a threshold parameter 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 such that every reciprocal player 
backtransfers positive amounts if the investment is large enough to produce a positive 
kindness term. Furthermore there is a negative correlation between the threshold of 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 and the 
investment xl. The necessary threshold 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 is decreasing when the investment xl increases. 
Thus, the larger the investment is, the higher is the probability of a positive backtransfer. This 
holds for both players, also the worse endowed player A, since the DK model doesn’t account 
for initial payoff differences. This result is interesting because it contrasts the prediction of the 
FS model. Hence, it is able to predict both positive investment of player P and positive 
backtransfer of player A. 
The two other regarding preference models discussed above predict different outcomes for 
our game. We think that the predictions of both models hold in some sense and that the 
observed outcome will be somewhere in between both predictions. Furthermore, if we take 
the result of Kleine et al. (2013) as a stylized fact, we expect that there might be an additional 
effect of voluntary leadership, i.e. we expect a higher backtransfer of player A if player P 
decides to move first voluntary. This cannot be explained by one of the models but seems to 
be natural in the sense that the risky choice to invest first can be interpreted as an additional 
signal of trust which is rewarded with strengthened reciprocal behavior of the second mover.  
Based on the above theoretical reasoning, we formulate the following empirical hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Transfer of player P (either investment or backtransfer depending on 
the sequence) is larger than transfer of player A. 
Hypothesis 2.2: If player P endogenously decides to move first the backtransfer of 
player A is higher than under exogenous treatment. 
Hypothesis 2.3: Compared to the symmetric treatment of Kleine et al. (2013) 
investment and backtransfer of player P increases and investment and backtransfer of 
player A decreases. 
22Δ𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 is the difference between the actual maximal payoff of player k at the node of her decision and the payoff 
he/she gets if he/she reciprocates with a positive backtransfer. This means that Δ𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 increases with 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘. 
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2.4 Experimental Procedures 
We used the same experimental procedures as in Kleine et al. (2013), but asked the first 
movers additionally about their belief about what the backtransfer of the other player might 
be. The experiments were conducted in the experimental economics lab at the University of 
Erfurt. It was computerized using the software z-Tree (see Fischbacher 2007). The subjects 
were recruited using the software Orsee (Greiner 2004). We ran 12 sessions with 246 
participants, which were students from different fields (social sciences and humanities). Each 
subject participated in only one game, thus the experiment was truly one-shot. Players 
received written instructions, were randomly paired and interacted anonymously (instructions 
are attached in Appendix B). The trust game with endogenous leadership was applied in nine 
sessions with 192 participants. The control treatment (P-First-Exogenous) was applied in 
three sessions with 54 participants. Since some invited participants did not show up, the 
number of participants in each session was not equal. Consequently, we had to run more 
sessions on the endogenous treatment to collect enough observations on voluntary leadership. 
After receiving and reading the written instructions the participants were matched randomly 
and played the investment game. In the endogenous treatment one player decided on the 
sequence. Then the investment decision was made by the first mover. After that we elicited 
the beliefs of the first mover about the amount sent back by the trustee. We incentivized this 
question with the Quadratic Scoring Rule23. We asked them to estimate the probability of 
every possible backtransfer. Thus, we obtained a probability distribution of every investor’s 
belief about his or her expected backtransfer. After that the second mover was informed about 
the first mover’s investment and decided upon the backtransfer. Finally both players were 
informed about their payoffs. 
After the trust game was played we elicited risk aversion and FS-preference parameters αj and 
βj by letting the participants play the lottery game introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) as 
well as the distribution game by Danneberg et al. (2007). Both games were incentivized. We 
use these measures to control our treatment effects for possible exogenously determined 
effects. Details on these procedures are provided in the Appendix B. We also collected the 
trust measure provided by the World Value Survey (2005)24. The participants additionally 
23 The Quadratic Scoring Rule was introduced by Brier (1950). The article of Offerman et al. (1996) popularized 
the method among experimental economists. 
24 The question is: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people? Participants may answer “yes” or “no”. 
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filled in the 16-PA-personality questionnaire of Brandstätter (1988) and provided some socio-
demographic characteristics, like: age, gender, experience in economic experiments and so on. 
This gives us the opportunity to control additionally for individual measures. All in all we 
have a number of incentivized and non-incentivized measures. The experimental procedures 
are summarized in Table 2.1. Each session took about 45 minutes, subjects were paid 
anonymously, and average earnings were about 18 EUR.25  
Table 2.1: Overview of Experimental Procedures 
Treatment Sequence of Games Observations 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
1. Trust Game with Endogenous Leadership 
2. Holt/Laury Game, Danneberg et. al. Game 
3. Trust Question, 16-PA and Socio-Demographic Questionnaire 
9 Sessions 
96 Pairs 
192 Participants 
Exogenous 
Leadership 
1. Trust Game With Exogenous Leadership 
2. Holt/Laury Game, Danneberg et. al. Game 
3. Trust Question, 16-PA and Socio-Demographic Questionnaire 
3 Sessions 
27 Pairs 
54 Participants 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Simple Analyses 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 provide summary statistics of investment and backtransfer decisions 
and summarize the beliefs of investors about backtransfer of trustees and the actual 
backtransfer rate – 39 out of 96 (about 40.6 %) principals decided to move first. 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics (Means) 
Treatment Investment 
x 
Belief 
b 
Backtransfer 
y 
Backtransfer 
Rate y/x 
# Obs. 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
P-First 
Endogenous 
6.85 
(3.03) 
5.06 
(1.90) 
4.95 
(3.49) 
0.83 
(0.73) 
39 
A-First 4.95 (3.30) 
4.53 
(2.08) 
5.39 
(3.42) 
1.40 
(1.16) 
57 
Exogenous Leadership 6.70 (2.74) 
4.59 
(1.72) 
4.19 
(2.84) 
0.66 
(0.39) 
27 
Notes: Table 2.2 includes means and standard deviations of investment, backtransfer and backtransfer rate by 
treatment. 
25 An average earning for a student job at the time of the experiment was about eight euro per hour.  
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According to the summary statistics in Table 2.2 there is no substantial difference between 
investment in P-First-Endogenous and P-First-Exogenous. Investment in A-First is smaller 
than under both conditions where the principal took the first move. The results do not change 
if medians are used (see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics (Medians) 
Treatment Investment 
x 
Belief 
b 
Backtransfer 
y 
Backtransfer 
Rate y/x 
# Obs. 
Endogenous 
Leadership 
P-First 
Endogenous 
7 
(5) 
4.63 
(1.31) 
5 
(6) 
0.8 
(0.5) 
39 
A-First 
5 
(6) 
4.78 
(2.88) 
5 
(6) 
1 
(0.5) 
57 
Exogenous Leadership 
7 
(5) 
5 
(2.01) 
4 
(6) 
0.67 
(0.57) 
27 
Notes: Table 2.3 includes medians and interquartile range of investment, backtransfer and backtransfer rate by 
treatment. 
Somewhat sharper is the difference in backtransfers and backtransfer rate between P-First-
Endogenous and P-First-Exogenous. The median of backtransfer in P-First-Endogenous is 
one point higher. The backtransfer rate is approximately 1.26 times of the one in P-First-
Exogenous. There is a distinct difference between backtransfer and backtransfer rate in A-
First, and the treatments where the principal invests indicate support for Hypothesis 2.2. 
The pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests shown in Table 2.4 all in all confirm the impression of 
the summary statistics. There is a highly significant difference in investment between P-First-
Endogenous and A-First, a weaker significant difference between P-First-Exogenous and A-
First, but no significant difference between P-First-Endogenous and P-First-exogenous. 
Differences in backtransfers between P-First-Exogenous and P-First-Endogenous are not 
significant. The backtransfer rate in A-First differs significantly from P-First-Exogenous and 
P-First-Endogenous. Thus, a first look at the data suggests no significant effects of 
endogenous leadership but a strong effect of the asymmetric endowment on investment and 
backtransfer. 
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Table 2.4: Mann-Whitney U Test of Treatment Differences 
Investment 
P-First-Endogenous versus P-First-Exogenous p = 0.795, N = 66 
P-First-Endogenous versus A-First-Endogenous p = 0.006, N = 96 
P-First-Exogenous versus A-First-Endogenous p = 0.019, N = 84 
Backtransfer 
P-First-Endogenous versus P-First-Exogenous p = 0.390, N = 66 
P-First-Endogenous versus A-First-Endogenous p = 0.536, N = 96 
P-First-Exogenous versus A-First-Endogenous p = 0.139, N = 84 
Backtransfer rate 
P-First-Endogenous versus P-First-Exogenous p = 0.487, N = 66 
P-First-Endogenous versus A-First-Endogenous p < 0.001 , N = 96 
P-First-Exogenous versus A-First-Endogenous p < 0.001 , N = 84 
Notes: P-values are calculated for two-tailed test. 
The joint distribution of backtransfers and investments displayed in Figure 2.1 clearly 
indicates a positive correlation between investment and backtransfer. 
Figure 2.1: Sunflowerplot of Backtransfer over Investment 
 
Notes: Small dots represent one observation. In larger dots (called flowers) one line (called petal) is one 
observation. The curve is fitted with polynomial regression. 
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The petals represent clustering of observations and the polynomial regression fit is 
represented by the red curve. Spearman rank correlation coefficient between backtransfer and 
investment is positive and statistical significant (𝜌𝜌 = 0.477, p < 0.001, N = 123), which 
supports a strong trust and reciprocity mechanism. 
2.5.2 Regression Analyses of Investment 
We use regression analyses in order to test the robustness of our treatment differences. 
Thereby we are able to control the influence of other variables, namely: beliefs, social 
preferences, risk attitudes and personal characteristics. The conditional distribution of 
backtransfer on investment (shown in Figure 2.1) indicates clustering of observations on the 
upper bound and some outliers. Therefore we do not use OLS-regressions. We decided to use 
the more robust Median regression due to the outlier problem and the Tobit regression due to 
the clustering of observations on the upper bound. 
Table 2.5 reports the results of different model specifications for regressions of investment on 
some potentially explanatory variables. There are no statistical relevant explanatory variables 
for investment beneath the 0-1-dummy variable for the treatment A-First and the variable 
belief, which is the average over expected backtransfer of the investor.26 
The Median regression in Table 2.5 fits well (pseudo R2 = 0.338). The base category of both 
regressions is P-First-exogenous. Both models in Table 2.5, the Median und the Tobit 
regression, show that there is a high significant positive effect of belief on investment. The 
higher the expected backtransfer, the higher is the investment or vice versa. Furthermore there 
is no significant effect of endogenous leadership. The 0-1 coded treatment dummy for P-
First-endogenous remains insignificant. Principals who decide to invest instead of passing the 
first move to the agent do not invest more than principals who have to move first 
exogenously. But in line with the summary statistics and the nonparametric tests, agents who 
have to move first invest less than principals, which is shown by the negative high significant 
coefficient of the treatment dummy A-First. All excluded variables, like psychological 
measures and socioeconomic variables, have no significant effects on the investment decision. 
26 To find the best model we also apply Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) techniques. This seems unavoidable 
because we have a set of 18 potentially explanatory variables, and we don’t rely on backward exclusion. Since 
this could produce multicollinearity problems. We use the R algorithm from Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009) 
to apply a model selection mechanism based on BMA. Even if the algorithm is performed for an OLS model 
and without modeling prior information it confirms the results of simple correlation analysis of the variables, 
i.e. pair wise regression fit, graphs of investment and other potential explanatory variables which are not 
reported. 
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Even risk aversion has – contrary to Kleine et al. (2013) – no significant effect and is 
therefore also excluded from the regression. 
Table 2.5: Regression Results of Regression on Investment 
Dependent Variable: Investment, Base Category is P-First-Exogenous 
 Median Regression Tobit Regression 
Variable Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Two-Tailed) 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Two Tailed) 
Belief (Average) 
1.165 
(0.125) 
<0.001 
1.461 
(0.154) 
<0.001 
P-First-
Endogenous 
-0.663 
(0.695) 
0.342 
-0.264 
(0.752) 
0.726 
A-First 
-1.712 
(0.653) 
0.010 
-1.999 
(0.690) 
0.004 
Constant 
1.430 
(0.795) 
0.075 
0.579 
(0.878) 
0.511 
N 123 123 
Pseudo R2 0.338 0.150 
Notes: Table 2.5 includes regression results for investment as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 contain 
coefficients and two-tailed p-values of the Median regression. Column 4 and 5 contain coefficients and two-
tailed p-values of the of Tobit regression. Standard errors are included in parenthesis. 
2.5.3 Regression Analyses of Backtransfer 
Table 2.6 summarizes the regression analysis of backtransfer.27 Again we use Median and 
Tobit regressions. The Median regression fits well overall (pseudo R2 = 0.326). The base 
category is P-First-Exogenous. As expected, investment enters the regression with a high 
statistically significant positive coefficient. Consequently, this indicates that the trust-
reciprocity-mechanism works well even in an environment with asymmetric endowed players. 
All other variables are 0-1 coded dummies. Again, as indicated by nonparametric analysis, 
there is no effect of P-First-Endogenous. The dummy variable for A-First is significant and 
comparable high. This means that player P, who decides to delegate the first move, 
reciprocates stronger to investment decisions of player A. Remember that player P’s 
endowment is five times higher than the endowment of players A. The variable Experimental 
Experience, which is coded as 1, if the person participated in any other experiment before, is 
significant and negative. For that reason somewhat experienced subjects show a lower 
backtransfer than others. 
27 Again we pretest the model structure by employing a BMA algorithm. Table 2.6 includes the specification of 
the regression as suggested by the BMA algorithm. 
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Table 2.6: Regression Results of Regressions on Backtransfer 
Dependent Variable: Backtransfer, Base Category is P-First-Exogenous 
 Median Regression Tobit Regression 
Variable Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Two-Tailed) 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
(Two-Tailed) 
Investment 
0.652 
(0.060) 
<0.001 
0.724 
(0.101) 
<0.001 
P-First-
Endogenous 
0.000 
(0.565) 
1.000 
0.124 
(0.841) 
0.883 
 
A-First 
1.304 
(0.548) 
0.019 
1.939 
(0.822) 
0.020 
Alpha-Missing 
-2.087 
(0.655) 
0.002 
-1.797 
(1.197) 
0.136 
Alpha-High 
1.130 
0.456) 
0.015 
1.279 
(0.693) 
0.068 
Beta-Missing 
0.783 
(0.641) 
0.225 
1.533 
(0.982) 
0.121 
Beta-High 
1.478 
(0.437) 
0.001 
1.791 
(0.684) 
0.010 
Experimental 
Experience 
-1.609 
(0.408) 
<0.001 
-1.703 
(0.611) 
0.006 
Constant 
0.696 
(0.690) 
0.316 
-0.260 
(1.051) 
0.805 
N 123 123 
Pseudo R2 0.326 0.106 
Notes: Table 2.6 includes regression results for backtransfer as dependent variable. Columns 2 and 3 contain 
coefficients and two-tailed p-values of the Median regression. Column 4 and 5 contain coefficients and two-
tailed p-values of the of Tobit regression. Standard errors are included in parenthesis. 
Notice that the inequality aversion parameters will have different effects in the sub treatments. 
On the one hand unfavorable inequality aversion measured by Alpha will affect the 
backtransfer decision of player A negatively. On the other hand favorable inequality aversion 
measured by Beta will affect player P’s backtransfer decision in treatment A-First as well as 
his/her investment decision in the P-First treatments positively. However, the expected 
difference in effects between sub treatments is not supported by our regression. The variable 
Beta-High enters with a significant and positive coefficient28, i.e. more inequality averse 
players should provide higher backtransfers. Alpha-High is also statistically significant but 
28 Beta-High is coded 1 if the favorable inequality aversion parameter exceeds the median which is about 0.25. 
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positive.29 This contradicts the theoretical expectation about the effects of inequality aversion 
parameters. Beta-Missing and Alpha-Missing are nuisance variables for the participants who 
had intransitive preferences with respect to the elicitation of the inequality aversion 
parameters. Alpha-Missing is statistically significant and has the coefficient with the highest 
amount.30 The Tobit specifications show almost the same effects. All in all our regressions 
supports Hypothesis 2.1. The weaker player A reveals less amounts of transfer in both 
sequences. And the regression analysis rejects Hypothesis 2.2. There seems to be no effect of 
endogenous leadership. 
2.5.4 Comparison with the Symmetric Treatment  
To complete our analysis we compare our results of the asymmetric treatment with the results 
of the symmetric treatment of Kleine et al. (2013). Remember that the design of this 
experiment is identical. The only difference is that both, P and A, are endowed symmetrically 
with an endowment of 10 ECU. For this analysis we do not rely on regression analysis 
because of the complex interpretation of the treatment dummies.31 Therefore we use robust 
nonparametric tests. The investment decisions are compared with Mann-Whitney U tests. The 
results together with the data averages are presented in Table 2.7. 
The difference between the P-First-Exogenous treatments is that player P in the asymmetric 
treatment is endowed with 50 ECU and with 10 ECU in the symmetric treatment. The 
difference between the means is not significant on a five percent level. Thus, better endowed 
players who have to invest first only invest marginally more than symmetrically endowed 
players. The differences between the P-First-Endogenous treatments are that in the symmetric 
treatment both players are endowed equally with 10 ECU, and in the asymmetric treatment 
player P is endowed with 50 ECU. Here the Mann-Whitney U test rejects the hypothesis that 
both means are equal (p = 0.008). This indicates that in the asymmetric treatment the better 
endowed players P, who decides to move first, invest substantial smaller amounts than they 
do in the symmetric treatment. The differences between the A-First-Endogenous treatments 
are as follows: in the asymmetric treatment player A faces a counterpart that is endowed with 
50 ECU; while in the symmetric treatment A-First-Endogenous, A and his/her counterpart are 
29 Alpha-High is coded as 1 if the unfavorable inequality aversion parameter exceeds the mean which is about 
0.45. 
30 We have 18 participants where Alpha is missing. Therefore we introduced coefficient Alpha-Missing that is 
necessary to avoid the exclusion of the 18 observations in the regression analysis. 
31 Note that we had to include 5 treatment dummies into one regression with on base category. This produces a 
very complex and circumbendibus interpretation of the particular treatment dummies. 
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equally endowed with 10 ECU. In both treatments A has to move first as a consequence of 
player P’s decision. The test rejects the hypothesis that both means of investment are equal (p 
= 0.002). Players A in the symmetric treatments invest substantially more than worse 
endowed players A in the asymmetric treatment. 
Table 2.7: Average Investment and Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Investment P-First-Exogenous P-First-Endogenous A-First-Endogenous 
Symmetric Treatment 5.40 
(20) 
9.13 
(16) 
6.83 
(64) 
Asymmetric Treatment 6.70 
(27) 
6.85 
(39) 
4.95 
(57) 
P-Value 0.0987 0.0079 0.0020 
Note: Table 2.7 contains averages of investment decisions for all sub treatments within the symmetric and 
asymmetric treatment. The numbers of observations are included in parenthesis. P-value is for the two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U test for differences between the averages in a sub treatment (columns) and between symmetric 
and asymmetric treatment (rows). 
Since investment and backtransfer are positive correlated, one has to account for differences 
in investment in order to analyze differences in backtransfer decisions. Therefore we use 
relative backtransfers to compare both treatments.32 The results of the Mann-Whitney U tests 
and the means of relative backtransfers are reported in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8: Average Relative Backtransfer and Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Relative Backtransfer P-First-Exogenous P-First-Endogenous A-First-Endogenous 
Symmetric Treatment 0.94 
(20) 
0.89 
(16) 
0.88 
(63) 
Asymmetric Treatment 0.66 
(27) 
0.81 
(39) 
1.37 
(54) 
P-Value 0.4889 0.0823 0.0007 
Note: Table 2.8 contains averages of relative backtransfer for all sub treatments within the symmetric and 
asymmetric treatment. The numbers of observations are included in parenthesis. P-value is for two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U test for differences between the averages in a sub treatment (columns) and between symmetric and 
asymmetric treatment (rows). 
Since the worse endowed players A in the asymmetric treatment have almost the same 
backtransfer rate as in the symmetric treatment33, the difference between symmetric and 
32 This is problematic in cases where the investment is zero. We exclude these eight cases from our analysis. 
Notice that even this measure is problematic since it has boundary problems in the sense that full investment 
of 10 money units could only be replied by a relative backtransfer of one while lower investments could be 
replied with a relative backtransfer which exceeds one. 
33 The backtransfer rate is identical with respect to the medians. Both medians are about 0.66. 
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asymmetric treatment for P-First-Exogenous is not significant. The relative backtransfer in 
the P-First-Exogenous treatment is weakly significantly higher in the symmetric treatment, 
i.e. equally endowed players A send relatively more back than players A who have less than 
their counterpart. The difference in the relative backtransfer of players P in the A-First-
Endogenous treatment is highly significant, i.e. the better endowed players P show a 
significantly higher relative backtranfer than equally endowed players P. 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
We find that in all treatments investment and backtransfer is strongly positively correlated, i.e. 
the participants show social preferences. In line with Hypothesis 2.1 we observe that worse 
endowed players A transfer less than better endowed players P which supports the FS model 
of inequality aversion. On the other hand, we observe high variance in the transfers of both 
players which contradicts the sharp predictions of the FS model – which are either no or full 
transfer by player P and no transfer by player A – and favors on the other hand the DK model 
of reciprocity. 
It seems that a mixture of both models may describe the data best. The FS model predicts that 
players P – being better off – transfer more than players A in order to reduce advantageous 
inequality while players A – being worse – transfer less, i.e. nothing, in order to reduce 
disadvantageous inequality. However, we observe that players A invest positive amounts. This 
observation cannot be explained by the FS model but might be explained by positive 
reciprocity. If players A decide, according to a DK utility function, their utility can increase 
with positive backtransfer. And even if A is a first mover, his/her expected utility might 
increase with positive investment if he/she beliefs that player P reciprocates to his/her 
kindness in form of positive investment with high backtransfers. 
Furthermore, our results contradict the hypothesis that voluntary leadership increases 
reciprocity if the players are endowed asymmetrically. Thus we cannot find evidence for our 
Hypothesis 2.2. However, this might be explained by the following reasoning. It seems that in 
the case of asymmetric endowed players the decision of the better endowed player to move 
first is not seen as a kind act. If this holds there is no reason left that predicts stronger 
reciprocity in P-First-Endogenous compared to P-First Exogenous. However, it could be that 
the decision of the better endowed player to move first is interpreted as a kind of a norm, 
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meaning that the richer player should decide to move first. Evidence for this interpretation is 
provided by the fact that the number of players, who decide to move first, is twice as high in 
the asymmetric game compared to the symmetric game of Kleine et al. (2013). Furthermore if 
the norm “rich-moves-first” applies, then differently motivated players P, i.e. efficiency 
oriented and not efficiency oriented players P, should decide to move first. In Kleine et al. 
(2013) all voluntary leaders invest high amounts while in the asymmetric game that we 
investigate here they do not. In P-First-Endogenous the average investment is about 9.13 
ECU in the symmetric treatment while it is about 6.85 ECU in the asymmetric treatment. 
There is much variance in the amount of investment even under the condition P-First-
Endogenous. While Kleine et al. (2013) observed self-selection in the sense of efficiency 
orientated players P deciding to move first, this is not the case for the asymmetric game. Thus 
endogenous leadership in an environment with asymmetric endowed players does not increase 
efficiency if the better endowed player can act as the voluntary leader. Therefore it might be 
of interest to run two additional treatments, one where A has to move first exogenously and 
another where A can decide about the sequence. In line with our findings these new treatments 
would produce high efficiency gains if A decides to move first and invest high amounts. 
Our results differ from the ones of Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) who find a substantial decrease 
in positive reciprocity caused by inequality in endowments. In contrast, we find no significant 
differences in the backtransfer rate between sub treatment P-First-Endogenous with 
symmetric endowments and sub treatment P-First-Endogenous with asymmetric 
endowments. However, better endowed players P undertake substantially less investment than 
players P who have the same endowment as players A. Furthermore, our design allows for 
more variance in the investment decision since we let the investor choose between 11 
different investment levels while Xiao and Bicchieri (2008) faced their subject with a binary 
choice between an investment of either zero or 10. Another difference and a potential 
explanation for the different results is that in our experiment not only investment but also 
backtransfer is tripled, i.e. reciprocation increases efficiency. Therefore it may be of interest to 
investigate whether this has an effect or not. A trust game with standard parameters and 
asymmetric endowments might answer these open questions. 
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3. Heterogeneous Agents, Incentives and Group Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
Organizing work in teams may be beneficial for organizations since teams can be more 
productive than individuals. But teams might suffer from shirking incentives if work effort 
cannot be fully controlled.34 The employer (principal) might wonder whether effort in teams 
(agents) can be increased by monetary incentives. Furthermore, if there is self-selection – i.e. 
agents can choose whether to work in a team or individually – the principal might wonder 
whether this leads the “right” agents to join teams, i.e. agents that have high team productivity 
and are cooperative; or whether it invites the “wrong” agents, i.e. agents that have low team 
productivity and/or are egoistic. There exists mixed evidence on sorting in the literature. 
Hamilton et al. (2003) analyze heterogeneous workers’ productivity and their sorting in 
individual or group piece rate payment schemes in the garment industry. They find that 
productivity of agents is improved if work is organized in teams. Contrary, Bäker and Pull 
(2010) show that self-selection in teams is appealing for low productive agents.  
These questions are addressed in our experimental study. In our principal-agent game there is 
one principal and 16 agents. The agents can choose either a group task (GT) or an individual 
task (IT) or no task (exit option). The group task has the structure of a public good game 
between four agents, so there are incentives to shirk by not providing effort in GT. The group 
return is split between the four team members and the principal according to a linear pay 
contract (GT-contract) that has been offered by the principal before the agents’ choices of 
task. Alternatively, if agents choose IT they subsequently choose a productive effort resulting 
in an individual return which is split according to the IT-contract. The latter contract, as the 
GT-contract, is linear, comprising a fixed wage and a return share.  
This game has been studied before in Königstein and Lünser (2011) for a homogenous 
population of agents as well as a heterogeneous population of agents. Under heterogeneity the 
agents differ with respect to their productivity in GT. We implement a new variant of the 
game by introducing observability of productivity types. Before the team members make their 
choice of effort in GT they are informed about all team members’ productivities. This 
34 A theoretical analysis of shirking can be found in the classical work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
Experimental evidence for shirking in team are inter alia documented by Meidinger et al. (2003) and 
Nalbantian, and Schotter (1997). 
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treatment, which differs from Königstein and Lünser (2011) where types were unknown to 
team members, allows the agents to discriminate their effort with respect to the teams’ 
productivity. As a consequence it might lead to stronger separation of player types between tasks. 
We use the social preference model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as a workhorse to provide 
theoretical predictions regarding the influence of contracts and productivity on task selection 
and effort in GT. The standard preference model of neoclassical economics is of no help here. 
It predicts zero effort in GT and no choice of GT at all, but these predictions are rejected right 
away by tons of data on public good experiments. Cooperation in public good games is 
predicted by several models of social preferences. We rely on the Fehr-Schmidt model for 
reasons of tractability. Comparing this model with other social preference models is not 
within the scope of our study. 
Other studies on sorting into teams and team incentive and social preferences are e.g. Teyssier 
(2007, 2008) and Vyrastekova et al. (2012). Teyssier (2007) theoretically investigates optimal 
group incentives for inequality averse agents. She shows that multiple payment schemes can 
be optimal if agents are inequity averse since these agents may prefer and perform better in 
teams. Teyssier (2008) investigates competition incentive schemes versus revenue sharing in 
teams. She reports that inequality averse agents prefer revenue sharing and perform better 
under that condition. Vyrastekova et al. (2012) investigates relations between trust, team 
sorting and team performance. She observes that agents who trust relatively more than others 
select group task more often and perform comparably better in teams.  
Our main hypotheses are, first, that the principal can positively influence effort in GT by 
offering higher return shares. Second, we predict that effort increase in team productivity. And 
finally, we predict that self-selection into GT depends on productivity and can be positively 
influenced by the terms of the GT-contract. Overall, the compound hypothesis of social 
preferences and rational play results in structural variables (monetary incentives and 
productivity) having strategic value which they don’t have under standard neoclassical 
preferences. 
The paper continues as follows: In Section 3.2 we describe the experimental game in detail. 
Theoretical analyses and empirical hypotheses are provided Section 3.3. Then we report 
experimental procedures in Section 3.4 and empirical results in Section 3.5. The final Section 
3.6 summarizes findings and has concluding remarks. 
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3.2 Experimental Game 
The experimental game is almost the same as proposed by Königstein and Lünser (2011).35 
Consider a principal-agent-game with one principal (manager) and 16 agents (indexed below 
by j = (1, 2, ..., 16)). Work of agents can be organized either in individual tasks (IT) or in 
group tasks (GT). Productivities of agents differ between tasks and agents. Half of the agents 
are high productive the others low productive. The proportion of high and low productive 
agents is common knowledge while actual productivity is privately known. High productive 
agents have a productivity of 7.5 in GT. Low productive agents have a productivity of 2.5 in 
GT. We also refer to these players as high types or low types. In IT both types of players have 
the same productivity of three. Thus low productive agents are relatively high productive in IT 
and high productive agents are relatively high productive in GT. 
The principal offers two linear pay contracts, one for IT and one for GT. The agents can 
choose one of these contracts or reject both. Effort in IT results in an observable, individual 
return. In GT workers are organized in groups of four. The effort choices of the four team 
members determine the joint return (group return). Prior to effort choices in GT the workers 
are informed about all team members’ productivities.36 The game is played over 10 periods. In 
each period the principal offers new pay contracts, each agent selects a task and chooses 
effort. The stages of the game are now described in detail. 
Stage 1: The principal offers linear pay contracts for IT ),( ITITIT sfw =  and GT 
),( GTGTGT sfw = . Each contract comprises a fixed wage ITf , GTf  and a return share ITs , 
GTs . Fixed wages and return shares are restricted as follows: 
{ }%100%,...,10%,0, ∈GTIT ss  and { }15,...,14,15, +−−∈GTIT ff  
Stage 2: Each agent may choose one of the tasks (IT or GT) which means that he or she 
accepts the terms of the contract. If the agent neither accept ITw nor GTw he or she decides for 
the exit option where he or she earns nothing in this period. If ITw is accepted, the agent 
works individually and will be paid according to ITw . Accepting GTw doesn’t ensure that an 
agent will work in a group. Since agents are matched in teams of four, accepting GTw is a 
35 Thus the description of the game is taken from there and is almost identical. 
36 This differs from Königstein and Lünser (2011) where the game is the same but productivity of team members 
are not observable. 
 41 
                                                 
preliminary decision. Those agents who cannot be matched are asked for an alternative (final) 
choice of either IT or the exit option. 
Stage 3a: Agents j who decided for IT choose individual work effort { }10,...,1,0∈je . Work 
effort is associated with the cost function jj eec 2)( = . The individual return in IT is 
determined by j
IT
j er 3= . 
Stage 3b: Agents j who decided for GT are informed about the productivities of their group 
members. Then they choose individual work effort { }10,...,1,0∈je . Work effort is associated 
with the cost function jj eec 2)( = . The joint return in GT of group k is determined by 
∑
=
=
4
1l
ll
GT
k eqr , 
GT
kr  is a weighted sum of efforts of all group members with weights 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 ∈ {2.5,7.5} ∀ j =1, 2, … ,16 given by the individual productivity parameters. Individual productivity jq  is 
determined at the beginning of the game, is privately known and stays constant throughout all 
10 periods. Payoffs of agents are determined as follows: 
In IT: 
)( j
IT
j
ITITIT
j ecrsf −+=Π  (1) 
In GT: 
)(
4
1
j
GT
k
GTGTGT
j ecrsf −+=Π  
(2) 
for all members j of team k. If the exit option is chosen j’s payoff is zero. The principal’s 
payoff is determined as follows. He or she has to pay fixed wages to all agents in IT and GT 
and collects residual returns. Thus the principal earns 
( ) ( )∑∑
∈∈
−−+−−=Π
GTk
GTGT
k
GT
ITj
ITIT
j
IT
P frsfrs 4)1()1(  (3) 
with ITj∈  representing an agent who has chosen IT and with GTk ∈ representing a group 
of four agents who have chosen GT. 
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All subjects were informed that roles of players are randomly chosen and that roles as well as 
types of productivity are fixed for all ten periods. Furthermore all subjects know that they 
were playing a repeated game with a single principal facing 16 agents and that groups in GT 
were formed randomly in each period. The disclosure of productivities of team members was 
such that agents could not identify each other by player number or otherwise. Thus, they 
could not track each other’s productivity or past choices. 
3.3 Theoretical Analysis and Behavioral Hypotheses 
We describe in an intuitive manner theoretical solutions to the game from the perspective of 
efficiency as well as individual rationality conditional on egoistic or social preferences. A 
more detailed analysis can be found in Königstein and Lünser (2011).  
The efficient solution of the game mandates low type agents to choose IT and provide 
maximal effort and high type agents to choose GT and provide maximal effort. To see this 
notice that marginal productivities are higher than marginal cost at all effort levels, that the 
low type agent is more productive in IT than in GT and that this is vice versa for the high type 
agent. These choices maximize the joint payoff of the principal and all agents together and 
this payoff could be distributed evenly or unevenly by an appropriate choice of the contract. 
However, this collectively optimal outcome cannot be reached under individual rationality if 
players have egoistic preferences. Namely, as in any public good game it is not rational to 
contribute positive effort in GT. Therefore, effort in GT will be zero no matter how strong 
monetary incentives GTs  are, and the principal should not offer a positive fixed wage GTf . 
The best that the principal may do is to induce all agents to choose IT and provide maximal 
effort. This can be reached by a contract that satisfies 𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≥ 2 3⁄  (incentive compatibility 
constraint) and 𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≥ 20 − 30 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (participation constraint). 
This solution, which follows from the standard assumption of economics of egoistic and 
rational players, will not be able to explain the empirical data. IT is instructive to view it as a 
benchmark case, but it has been shown in many public good experiments that participants 
cooperate, indeed. And we find cooperation as well (see below). Therefore, to have any 
chance of matching theory and data one needs a more complex theoretical model. Social 
preference models offer an alternative that is able to explain cooperation in public good 
games. Assuming social preferences of the type introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 
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henceforth FS), Königstein and Lünser (2011) show that there exist subgame perfect 
equilibria in which agents choose GT and positive effort if agents are sufficiently inequality 
averse: E.g. if all agents are inequality averse the existence conditions for this solution are 
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ≥ 1 − 516 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 for low types and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ≥ 1 − 1516 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 for high types. 
These conditions show that cooperation is reached more easily among highly productive 
types, if players are inequality averse and if monetary incentives are stronger. Thus, contrary 
to the benchmark solution with egoistic preferences the solution with FS-preferences predicts 
that the principal’s design of the GT-contract has strategic value: Team production may vary 
with incentives. Specifically, our empirical hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 3.1.A: In GT a higher return share 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 offered by the principal induces 
higher effort. 
Hypothesis 3.1.B: In GT effort of high productive types is larger than that of low 
productive types. 
Hypothesis 3.1.C: Effort in GT is positively correlated with the degree of inequality 
aversion. 
The influence of the second payoff variable, the fixed wage, is less clear. On the one hand 
changes in 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 leave payoff differences between team members unaffected for all effort 
choices. Therefore 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 should have no influence on effort in GT. On the other hand, the 
solution proposed by Königstein and Lünser (2011) assumes that considerations of equality 
are taken only with respect to other team members but not with respect to the principal. If 
however, the participants in the experiment consider the principal’s payoff as well, they might 
respond higher fixed wages by reciprocally choosing higher effort. An additional 
complication is that fixed wage and return share should be correlated negatively. This is 
predicted theoretically via the participation constraint and it will in fact hold empirically. For 
these reasons we do not propose a clear influence of 𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 of effort in GT. 
Since Hypothesis 3.1 proposes positive effort in GT this should affect the choice of task as 
well. The agent’s choice of task is not necessarily IT as predicted for egoistic players but it 
may be GT. Specifically, it depends on expected earnings under both tasks and thus it depends 
on fixed wage, return share and productivity type. 
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Hypothesis 3.2.A: GT is chosen more likely the higher the offered GT-payment is and 
the lower the offered IT-payment is. Offered payments depend on both, fixed wages and 
return shares. 
Hypothesis 3.2.B: GT is chosen more likely by high productive types than by low 
productive types. 
Hypothesis 3.2.C: The probability of choosing GT is positively correlated with the 
degree of inequality aversion. 
Hypotheses 3.1.A, 3.1.B, 3.2.A and 3.2.B were also investigated in Königstein and Lünser 
(2011). They did not study 3.1.C and 3.2.C since they did not take measures of inequality 
aversion. Furthermore, a novel feature of our design is that the team members observe each 
other’s productivity type before choosing effort. This allows agents to discriminate their effort 
choice with respect to the average productivity of the team. Consequently, under observable 
types it will be more difficult for low productive types to successfully join teams than under 
non-observable types. Therefore we predict a stronger, and thus more efficient, separation of 
types in our experiment than under non-observable types as in Königstein and Lünser (2011). 
Hypothesis 3.3: Separation of productivity types is stronger here than in Königstein and 
Lünser (2011) in the sense that of all agents who choose GT the proportion of low types 
vs. high types is smaller here than in Königstein and Lünser (2011). 
Hypotheses 3.1 to 3.3 are our main behavioral hypotheses. It should be mentioned that our 
experiment is not intended to test and propose the FS-preference model against other social 
preference models. Cooperation in public good games is also predicted by other social 
preference models. Showing which one is more successful is not within the scope of our 
study. We rather rely on the FS model as a workhorse. The mere fact that social preferences 
can generate cooperation (if preference parameters are chosen appropriately) is an important 
step forward compared to standard neoclassical preferences. Namely, the influence of 
structural variables like monetary incentives may change with changes in preferences and it 
makes little sense to assume preferences that are immediately refuted by the data as it is the 
case with standard neoclassical preferences.  
 45 
3.4 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the experimental economics lab at the University of Erfurt. 
It was computerized by using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and all participants are 
recruited via Orsee (Greiner 2004). In total 153 students of various disciplines participated in 
the experiment. Each student participated only in one session. In the laboratory participants 
were separated by cabins. They received written instructions and examples to ensure that they 
had understood the rules of the game. 
Participants were randomly and anonymously assigned to one of the roles. Roles were labeled 
“participant A” for the principal, “participant B” for agents with low productivity and 
“participant C” for agents with high productivity. The game was played according to the rules 
described above. At the end of each period the period payoffs were calculated by the 
computer program and displayed on the screen. Agents were informed about their own payoff 
and group return of their own team. The principal was informed about task selection as well 
as all return resulting from IT and GT. Payoffs were shown in points and the exchange rate of 
EUR and points was commonly known. The exchange rate was one euro per 100 points for 
the principal and one euro per 10 points for agents. Show-up fees were 0.5 euro for the 
principal and five euro for agents. 37 
After the participants had played the game we ran additional experiments and used 
questionnaires to collect additional data on individual characteristics. We elicit social 
preferences as proposed by Danneberg et al. (2007) and risk preferences as proposed by Holt 
and Laury (2002). Both elicitation mechanisms were incentivized. Screenshots of the 
procedure as well as the instructions of the game are attached to Appendix B. Finally, the 
participants had to fill out the 16-PA personality questionnaire of Brandstätter (1988) and 
answer some questions on socio-demographics (gender, age, etc.). 
Sessions took about one hour and 45 minutes. Average earnings where about 15 euro. 
Decisions were taken privately and payments were made such that subjects did not see each 
other’s payments. 
37 The experimental procedures of the principal agent game are almost the same as in Königstein and Lünser 
(2011). Thus the description is partially taken from there. 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the collected experimental data.  
Table 3.1: Overview of Experimental Data 
Number of Periods  10  
Number of Principal Choices Contract Design 90  
Number of Agent Choices Task Choice, Effort 1440  
Contract Design 
(Mean, Std. Dev.) 
Return Share GT 63.6% (27.3) 
Fixed Wage GT -0.8 (7.8) 
Return Share IT 69.3% (22.1) 
Fixed Wage IT -2.5 (7.1) 
Choice of Task 
(Freq.) 
Group Task (GT) 928  
Individual Task (IT) 370  
None (Exit Option) 142  
Effort 
(Mean, Std. Dev.) 
Group Task (GT) 4.511 (3.084) 
Individual Task (IT) 5.831 (3.410) 
We ran nine sessions. Since the game had 10 periods, we collected a total of 90 principal 
decisions and 1440 agent decisions. The majority of agents decided for the group task rather 
than the individual task or none. Effort in GT is positive and is on average about 4.5. Contract 
design is such that the four contract variables are correlated.  
Table 3.2 shows Spearman rank correlation coefficients. Specifically, return share and fixed 
wage in GT as well as return share and fixed wage in IT are negatively and highly 
significantly correlated. This should be expected from a theoretical viewpoint. It has to be 
taken into account later since it may lead to multicollinearity in regression analyses. Return 
shares of the two tasks and both fixed wages are positively but not significantly correlated. 
Table 3.2: Correlations of Contract Variables 
Correlation Spearman’s Rho P-Value 
Return Share GT ~ Fixed Wage GT -0.534 < 0.001 
Return Share IT ~ Fixed Wage IT -0.483 < 0.001 
Return Share GT ~ Return Share IT 0.139 0.192 
Fixed Wage GT ~ Fixed Wage IT 0.167 0.116 
  N = 90 
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3.5.2 Effort in GT 
We now look at effort in GT. As expected a substantial fraction of the participants choose GT 
and provide positive effort in teams. Figure 3.1 shows frequency distributions separately for 
high productive types and low productive types. Figure 3.2 shows frequency distributions 
separately for teams of different levels of average productivity. While it seems that effort 
increases in average team productivity (see Figure 3.2), a difference between high and low 
types can hardly be detected (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: Effort in GT by Agent’s Productivity Type 
 
To gain a more accurate view we have to control for other influencing factors. This is done in 
a regression analysis reported in Table 3.3. It is a Tobit regression analysis on effort choice in 
GT as dependent variable with lower bound zero and upper bound 10. The influence of return 
share, fixed wage and productivity was estimated separately for symmetric teams – i.e. all 
four team members have the same productivity – and asymmetric teams. In asymmetric teams 
the variables return share, fixed wage, team productivity and a dummy for asymmetric teams 
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(the reference category are symmetric and highly productive teams) are highly statistically 
significant.38  
Result 3.1.A and 3.1.B: The influences of return share and productivity clearly support 
Hypotheses 3.1.A and 3.1.B. 
Figure 3.2: Effort in GT by Average Productivity of Teams 
 
For symmetric teams neither the return share nor the fixed wage have a significant influence. 
But this hardly weakens Results 3.1.A and 3.1.B for two reasons: First, insignificance does 
not mean that the results are wrong but just that they don’t hold for all subgroups. Second, 
symmetric teams comprise only a small fraction (6.5%) of all teams. We will look at the 
influence of incentives in symmetric teams in more detail below. Symmetric teams of low 
productivity provide significantly lower effort than symmetric teams of high productivity (see 
dummy low team productivity). Furthermore there is a decrease in provision of effort over 
time (see the influence of period).  
38 To account for repeated measurement the standard errors where determined by assuming clustering on 
individuals. Since the choice of effort in GT is made conditional on the choice of task there might be a 
selection bias in effort choices. To check this possibility we estimated an alternative specification following 
the Heckman procedure Heckman (1979). We found the selection effect to be insignificant. 
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To illustrate the results we estimated a revised version of model 1 eliminating the insignificant 
regressors return share and fixed wage for symmetric teams (see Table C 1 in Appendix C). 
Relying on this regression model Figure 3.3 shows predicted values of effort in GT for 
different levels of the return share and for different teams. Accordingly, symmetric teams with 
high average productivity of 7.5 provide higher effort than all other teams and do so 
independent of the offered return share. Average effort is about seven. This is different for 
asymmetric teams. These teams have an average productivity of 3.75, five or 6.25, and effort 
responds strongly to changes in return share 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼; at low return share levels effort is close to 
minimal; at high return share levels effort is about six. The predicted effort lines are ordered 
according to productivity which illustrates that effort is positively correlated with average 
productivity of the team. Finally, the predicted effort line is flat for symmetric teams of low 
productivity (productivity = 2.5). At high return share levels (𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 > 0.6) predicted effort in 
these teams is lowest of all teams. However, at low levels of return share is larger than effort 
in teams that are asymmetric but have higher average productivity. Symmetry seems to 
stimulate higher effort. 
Table 3.3: Tobit Regression Analysis of Effort Choice in GT 
Variable  Coefficient Robust Std. Error P-Value 
Asymmetric Team 
Return Share 0.050 0.008 < 0.001 
Fixed Wage 0.071 0.028 0.012 
Team Productivity 0.323 0.141 0.023 
Dummy Asym. Team -8.932 3.328 0.007 
Symmetric Team 
Return Share -0.015 0.043 0.478 
Fixed Wage 0.079 0.112 0.729 
Dummy Low Team Productivity -3.495 1.201 0.004 
Period  -0.266 0.056 < 0.001 
Constant  9.720 3.220 0.003 
Model Statistics: N = 800; P-Value < 0.001; Pseudo R² = 0.0324; Dependent Variable: Effort in GT 
Overall it seems that in high productive and symmetric teams effort is close to the upper 
bound so there is little scope for monetary incentives to further increase cooperation. This 
may explain why the return share has no significant influence in these teams. In symmetric 
and low productive teams effort does not respond positively to return share variations either. 
In such teams average individual productivity is 2.5 while individual marginal cost is two. 
Thus, the team as a whole can benefit from higher production only at very high return shares 
(𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 > 0.8).  
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Contrary to Hypothesis 3.1.C inequality aversion as measured by the Danneberg et al. 
experiment had no significant influence on effort in GT. We tried several regression 
specifications (not reported here) but never found significance for effort in GT. We see two 
possible reasons for this. First, effort in GT is taken conditional on self-selection into GT. It 
may be that only the selection of GT is positively influenced by inequality aversion (which 
will turn out below) but not the effort in GT conditional on that choice. Secondly, the 
Danneberg et al. experiment might be a weak empirical measure of FS-preferences. There is 
some indication of this possibility due to the large fractions of players for which either the α-
measure or the β-measure is missing (36 of 144 agent = 25%). 
Figure 3.3: Predicted Value Plot for Regression Model 1 
 
Notes: Figure 3.3 displays predicted values of effort in GT for teams according to average team productivity 
dependent on return share. The calculation of the predicted value based on the regression model in Table C 1 in 
Appendix C. 
3.5.3 Choice of Task 
According to the game rules the agents may choose one out of three tasks, GT or IT or none of 
these (exit option). The frequencies of choices are shown in Table 3.4.39 Accordingly agents 
of high productivity type choose GT more frequently than low productivity types. 
39 These are frequencies of initial task choices. Final choices differed somewhat since agents in GT had to be 
matched in teams of four participants. Specifically, the number of final choices of GT was 800. 
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Table 3.4: Frequency of Task Choices 
Agent’s Choice Group Task Individual Task Exit Option Total 
Low Productive Agents 441 205 74 720 
High Productive Agents 487 165 68 720 
Total 928 370 142 1440 
To investigate the influence of contract design and productivity on task choice we ran a 
multinomial logit regression reported in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results of Task Choices 
 GT versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT 0.036 0.004 < 0.001 
Fix in GT 0.133 0.016 < 0.001 
Share in IT -0.032 0.005 < 0.001 
Fix in IT -0.177 0.019 < 0.001 
HT 0.476 0.166 0.004 
Alpha-High 0.499 0.191 0.009 
Alpha-Missing 0.268 0.234 0.252 
Beta-High 0.284 0.175 0.104 
Beta-Missing -0.359 0.285 0.207 
Period 0.237 0.096 0.014 
Period2 -0.016 0.008 0.052 
Constant -0.506 0.550 0.358 
Exit Option versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT -0.002 0.006 0.695 
Fix in GT -0.094 0.021 < 0.001 
Share in IT -0.021 0.008 0.008 
Fix in IT -0.260 0.031 < 0.001 
HT 0.404 0.334 0.226 
Alpha-High 0.801 0.403 0.047 
Alpha-Missing -0.097 0.625 0.877 
Beta-High 0.335 0.336 0.318 
Beta-Missing -1.377 0.586 0.019 
Period 0.382 0.232 0.101 
Period2 -0.019 0.017 0.283 
Constant -2.959 1.023 0.004 
Model Statistics: N = 1440; P-Value < 0.001; Pseudo R2 = 0.2462 
The upper panel shows estimation results for the choice of GT versus the reference category 
IT. The lower panel shows estimation results for the choice of the exit option versus IT. We 
are mainly interested in the choice of GT versus IT therefore we focus on the upper panel. 
With respect to the influence of return shares and fixed wages we find that each of the four 
estimated coefficients shows the predicted sign and is highly statistically significant.40 
40 Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on individuals. 
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Result 3.2.A: In line with Hypothesis 3.2.A the probability of choosing GT increases in 
the payment offered by the GT-contract (𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 ,  𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 ) and decreases in the payment 
offered by the IT-contract (𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ,  𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ). 
Result 3.2.B: High productive types choose GT more likely than low productive types. 
The latter is indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of dummy high productivity. 
Table 3.5 furthermore reports positive influences of the FS-preference parameters α and β. A 
joint test for α = β = 0 shows that the coefficients are jointly statistically significant 
(p = 0.016).  
We collect this finding as 
Result 3.2.C: GT is chosen more likely by individuals that are more inequality averse. 
Finally we find that the probability of choosing GT increases over time and does so at a 
decreasing rate (see variables period and period2). 
A subtle question with respect to the influence of productivity is whether productivity simply 
shifts the probability of choosing GT upward or whether high types respond in a different 
manner on return share or fixed wage than low types. Table C 2 in the Appendix C reports a 
refined regression model that allows for interaction effects of the dummy high productivity 
and the four payment variables. While three of the four interaction terms are significant the 
main effect of dummy high productivity becomes insignificant. We consider this result as 
non-conclusive. 
As a final step in the empirical analysis we want to assess Hypothesis 3.3. Table 3.6 shows 
predicted values (according to the regression model of Table 3.5) for the fraction of low types 
and high types under observable productivity for two different levels of 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼. 
Table 3.6: Separation of Productivity Types 
  Observable Productivity  Non-observable Productivity 
(Königstein/Lünser) 
  𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 0.5 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 0.8  𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 0.5 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 0.8 
Low Productive Agents  46.1% 48.3%  48.4% 49.3% 
High Productive Agents  53.9% 51.7%  51.6% 50.7% 
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All variables of the regression model except 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 and dummy high production were set to 
mean values. For comparison Table 3.6 also shows the respective predictions under non-
observable productivity as reported in Königstein and Lünser (2011). In line with Hypothesis 
3.3 there is stronger separation of types when types are observable; the fraction of low 
productivity types entering GT is smaller than with non-observable productivity. But the 
separation is far from being efficient. Efficiency calls for a percentage of high types in GT of 
100%. The self-selection of participants into tasks has led to an allocation of types that is only 
somewhat more efficient than a random allocation of types which would lead to an expected 
fraction of 50%. 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
In our experiment we find that effort in GT increases in the return share offered by the 
principal (Result 3.1.A). The terms of the linear GT-contract also influence the choice of task 
(Result 3.2.A). Thus, monetary incentives have strategic value for self-selection into teams 
and for the degree of team cooperation even if the group task has the structure of a public 
good game. This is counter to the standard neoclassical prediction but it can be rationalized 
assuming FS-preferences. 
Team cooperation increases in the team’s average productivity (Result 3.1.B). The 
participants anticipate this in their task choice which leads high productivity types to choose 
GT more likely than low productivity types (Result 3.2.B). But the separation of types is far 
from complete: Theoretically, the efficient allocation of types requires all high types to choose 
GT and all low types to choose IT. But in fact, for 𝑠𝑠𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 0.5 the empirically predicted 
proportion of high types is just 53.9%. Thus, self-selection leads to a very inefficient 
allocation of types to tasks. This result is moderated by observability (Result 3.3). If the team 
members are informed about types prior to effort choices, the separation of types is stronger 
than under unobservable types as reported by Königstein and Lünser (2011). 
However, there is a large gap for possible efficiency gains and one might speculate why the 
allocation of types is so inefficient. Again this question should be discussed within a 
framework of social preferences. The regression model for the choice of task showed that the 
FS-preference parameters have positive and significant influence on the probability of 
choosing GT (Result 3.2.C). This suggests that there are low productive but inequality averse 
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agents who enter teams in order to prevent inequality. In addition there might be a fraction of 
egoistic types that enter teams in order to shirk.41 But the fraction of egoists must be small 
because otherwise cooperation in teams would cease rather fast. 
Counter to what should be expected the FS-preference parameter did not prove significant 
within the GT-effort-regression. Thus, it may be that only the choice of task is correlated with 
inequality aversion but not the effort choice which is conditional the task choice. Another 
possibility we mentioned is that the empirical measure of FS-preference parameters is weak 
and should be improved. 
We found some indication that at low levels of incentives symmetric teams of low types show 
higher levels of cooperation than asymmetric teams of higher average productivity. It seems 
that symmetry helps to establish cooperation. But since only a small fraction of our 
observations are on symmetric groups, this effect should be seen as preliminary. 
In concluding we emphasize that the compound model of FS-preferences and rationality was 
successful in producing theoretical predictions that are well supported by the data. Of course, 
other models of social preferences might have been used instead. But to discriminate between 
such models was not our issue here. Rather we studied the influence of team incentives and 
productivity within a social preference framework to allow for predictions that are not to be 
rejected right away, which is the case if one follows the standard assumption of egoistic 
preferences. 
  
41 This is in line with the findings of Bäker and Pull (2010), Teyssier (2008) and Vyrastekova et al. (2012). 
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4. Quantal Response Equilibrium for an Ultimatum Game with 
Advance Investment 
4.1 Introduction 
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) 
provides a flexible framework for estimating structural models of behavior in experiments. It 
allows the researcher to estimate parameters of arbitrary utility functions. The QRE can be 
viewed as an expansion of the Nash Equilibrium concept: it captures both; fully rational 
behavior as predicted by the latter and completely randomized behavior as well as all 
intermediate forms. Thus in the QRE one player chooses the stochastic best reply to another 
players’ stochastic best reply. The imperfectness of choices can be interpreted as either 
decision errors or the influence of omitted variables within the postulated model. 
In this Chapter I will present a QRE model for a simple three stage ultimatum game. The first 
stage comprises simultaneous effort decisions of two players which determine their 
contribution to a joint production function. During the second stage one predetermined player 
proposes how to split the joint production output and at the third stage the other player either 
accepts or rejects the offer. 
In Section 4.2 I review the related literature. In Section 4.3 I describe the game and the 
transformation of the original game parameters first and then I formulate the QRE model. In 
Section 4.4 I present the results of the maximum likelihood estimation and I conclude with 
Section 4.5. 
4.2 Related Literature 
To the best of my knowledge this is the first study to apply the QRE model to a three stage 
game which comprises both simultaneous and sequential decisions. The related literature can 
be classified into two threads, one on the theoretical background of the QRE model and one 
on its application to games. 
The pioneering work behind the QRE model was done by Luce (1959), Marschak (1960), 
Luce and Suppes (1965) and McFadden and Richter (1970). Luce (1959) introduced a choice 
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axiom which implies the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption (IRRA) and 
thus, building upon the IRAA, shows that the multinomial logit model can be derived as the 
appropriately specified model. Marshak (1960) introduces the random utility model which 
incorporates a random shock to the utility of every alternative. Marshak and Suppes (1965) 
and McFadden and Richter (1970) show that the Luce (1959) model is consistent with the 
random utility model if the random disturbances follow an Extreme Value Type I distribution. 
Later on McFadden (1974) introduces his conditional logit model which is widely known as 
the multinomial logit model. A brief history of the development of the logit model can be 
found in Kenneth E. Trains textbook on discrete choice methods (see Train 2003) and a more 
detailed history in McFadden’s Nobel lecture (see McFadden 2001). In the 1990s McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1995, 1996, and 1998) use QRE models for game theoretic applications and 
propose a particular parametric class of QRE, the logit equilibrium. 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) are the first to estimate parameters logit equilibrium models for 
decisions in games. Offerman et al. (1998) estimate parameters of a logit equilibrium model 
for a public good game. Hereafter the logit equilibrium is extensively used to describe 
behavior in games which cannot be explained by standard theory and the Nash Equilibrium 
concept including, inter alia, matching pennies games (Goeree et al. 2003), auction like games 
(Anderson et al. 2002), the volunteer’s dilemma (Goeree et al. 2005), the traveller’s dilemma 
(Capra et al. 1999) and simple lotteries (Laury and Holt 2002). Goeree and Holt (2000) 
estimate parameters of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function in a sequential three stage 
ultimatum bargaining game. Another study which draws on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
utility function and the logit equilibrium is Goeree et al. (2005). They estimate a Fehr Schmidt 
utility function in a simultaneous experiment on the volunteers’ dilemma. Yi (2005) and 
Kohler (2008) analyze the ultimatum game with a logit equilibrium model. Kohler (2008) 
estimates parameters of the utility function proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) with 
data from an ultimatum game conducted in Zimbabwe. 
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4.3 The Model 
4.3.1 The Ultimatum Game with Advance Production 
I consider a two player ultimatum game with advance production.42 Both players were 
randomly assigned to their roles. The game comprises three stages:  
In stage one both players i and j decide simultaneously about the effort 
𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘) ∈ {0, 1, 2, … , 30}  with 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗} 
they are willing contribute to a joint production. 
These efforts are associated with costs given by cost function 
c(𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘)) =  �  0                                                             15 + 12.5 𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘) − 1.73𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘)2 + 0.015𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘)3 if 𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘)=0 otherwise. 
The outcome of the production is given by production function 
𝑟𝑟�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)� = 22 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) + 44 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗). 
Since the marginal productivity of player j is two times the marginal productivity of player i, 
it is evident that player j is more productive than player i. 
In stage two player i is informed about the output of the joint production and decides upon 
how to split the common good by choosing an offer 
𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) ∈ �0, … , 𝑟𝑟�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)��. 
In stage three player j is informed about the output of the joint production and offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖). Then 
he/she can either accept or reject the offer which is indicated by function 
𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) = �0 if rejection of 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)    1 if acceptance of 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖). 
If offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) is rejected by player j the common good is not distributed among the players 
while they still have to bear their costs. 
42 The game is founded and implemented by Königstein and Tietz and published in Königstein (2000). 
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The payoff functions for the two players are given by 
π(𝑖𝑖) =  𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)��𝑟𝑟�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)� − 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)�;
π(𝑗𝑗) =  𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) − 𝑐𝑐�𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)�.                                
It is straightforward to show that the efficient solution of the game is 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) = 12 and 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗) = 16 
which results in a return of r(12, 16) = 968 associated with costs of c(12) = 115 for player i 
and c(16) = 243 for player j. Backward induction yields the subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game with 
𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) = 12, 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗) = 0, 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) = 1 and  𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) = 1. 
For further details see Königstein (2000). The dataset I use below stems from an 
implementation of this game by Königstein and Tietz in 1993 and 1994 in Frankfurt am Main. 
For a detailed description of the game and on how it was conducted see Königstein (2000). 
4.3.2 Modifications of the Initial Game 
For estimation purposes some parameters of the initial game introduced by Königstein (2000) 
have to be modified in order to avoid numerical problems while calculating the likelihood 
function. Effort decisions are still the same but censored at 𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘) > 18, thus 
𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘) ∈ {0, 1, 2, … , 18}. 
I censor the effort decisions to avoid estimating a model for decisions which results in a 
division of costs. Remember that effort decisions above 12 for player i and above 16 for 
player j are too high in the sense of not payoff maximizing. Furthermore the effort decisions 
are classified. The first class contains only zero effort, the second class contains one and two 
and so forth until the last class which contains 17 and 18. Thus for the estimation I only use 
10 classes of effort decisions 
𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} 
which are associated with cost 
𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘)) ∈ {0, 15 ,22 ,26 ,30, 39, 53, 76, 111, 161}. 
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These costs are class midpoints of the original costs. The OLS estimate of the cost function 
for these values is given by 
c(𝑒𝑒(𝑘𝑘)) = �  0                                                                  3.31 + 15.37 e(𝑘𝑘) − 4.03 e(𝑘𝑘)2 + 0.47 e(𝑘𝑘)3 if e(𝑘𝑘)=0otherwise. 
The return function remains unaltered and is given by 
𝑟𝑟�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) , 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)� = 22𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) + 44𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗). 
These changes let the efficient solution of the game fall into another class of effort decisions. 
The efficient solution is now 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) = 6 and 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗) = 8. This implies that the game theoretic 
solution is also changed and predicts zero effort of player j, 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) = 6, offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) = 1 and its 
acceptance by player j. All offers are also downscaled such that they have the same proportion 
to the return as they had before downscaling.43 Furthermore all efforts, costs, returns and 
offers are multiplied by 0.1 to avoid numerical problems with the likelihood maximizing 
procedure within the software package R. 
4.3.3 The Specification of the Logit Equilibrium 
The logit equilibrium consists of a set of choice probability distributions for every single 
decision of the game. All of them have to be correctly anticipated by all players, i.e. players 
have consistent beliefs. In the ultimatum game with advance production every stage has its 
particular choice probabilities. In stage three these are the probabilities of acceptance of any 
possible offer conditional on every possible history of the game. The probability of offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) 
being accepted by player 𝑗𝑗 is given by 
𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)(𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) = 1|(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))). 
Stage two is described by the probability distribution of offers conditional on every possible 
combination of efforts. The probability of offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) being made by player 𝑖𝑖 is given by 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) |(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))). 
43 I’m aware of the problem that downscaling produces distorted probabilities in the formula of the logit 
equilibrium. But this seems unimportant since I want to show an estimation procedure for this kind of game 
and do not want to make prediction of the behavior in the initial game. 
 60 
                                                 
Stage one is described by the probability distributions of all possible efforts of both players. 
The probability of player i choosing effort 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) is given by 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)) 
and the probability of player j is choosing effort 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗) is given by 
𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)(𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)). 
Since the whole history of the game is known, the acceptance probabilities of stage three can 
be computed easily. The probability of accepting offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) is given by 
𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)(𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) = 1|(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))) =  exp(𝜆𝜆(3)𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)))
exp(𝜆𝜆(3)𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)))+exp(𝜆𝜆(3)𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(−𝑐𝑐(e(𝑗𝑗))) . 
Where 𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) is the utility of player 𝑗𝑗 if he/she accepts a particular offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖), 
𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(−𝑐𝑐(e(𝑗𝑗))) is the utility of the costs of player j if the offer is rejected and 𝜆𝜆(3) is the 
unknown precision parameter which has to be estimated.44 The probability of rejecting an 
offer is simply 
𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)�𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� = 0 |(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))� = 1 −  𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)�𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� = 1|(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))�. 
On stage two player i has to anticipate these acceptance probabilities to calculate expected 
utilities for all possible offers conditional on a given history. The expected utility of any offer 
𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) is given by 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� =  𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) �𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� = 1|(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))�𝑈𝑈�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� +  𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) �𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� = 0|(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))�𝑈𝑈�−𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)�. 
According to these expected utilities the probability of offer 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) to be chosen is given by 
𝑝𝑝(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)) =  exp(𝜆𝜆(2)𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)))
∑  exp (𝜆𝜆(2)𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖))𝑟𝑟(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖),𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))
𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)=0 . 
Here 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� is the above described expected utility of a particular offer and 𝜆𝜆(2) is the precision 
parameter of the proposer in stage two of the game. 
44 The parameter 𝜆𝜆 can be interpreted as the inverse of the standard deviation of the underlying decision 
generating process, the random utility model. 
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In stage one both players have to anticipate the probabilities of the following stages and form 
expected utilities for every possible effort combination. First they have to form an expected 
value of the expected utilities of offers 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑘𝑘)�?̅?𝑜�(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))�. These are weighted averages of 
expected utilities of offers of the proposer 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑖𝑖)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� and the responder 𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)�, weighted 
with the probabilities of offers for every possible combination of efforts for 𝑙𝑙 ∈ {𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗} and are 
given by 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑘𝑘)�?̅?𝑜�(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))� = � 𝑝𝑝�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)�𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑙𝑙)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)�.𝑟𝑟(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖),𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))
𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)=0  
Together with the correct anticipation of the effort probabilities of the other player they can 
now form expected utilities of particular efforts. Thus player i’s expected utility of a particular 
effort is 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑖𝑖)(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)) = � 𝑝𝑝�𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)�𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑖𝑖)�?̅?𝑜�(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))�,9
𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)=0  
while player j’s is 
𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)) = � 𝑝𝑝�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)�𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)�?̅?𝑜�(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖), 𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))�.9
𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)=0  
In consequence the probabilities for particular efforts can be derived as 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)� = exp (𝜆𝜆𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑖𝑖)(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)))
∑ exp(𝜆𝜆(1)𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑖𝑖)(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖))9
𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)=0  ; 
𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)�𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)� = exp (𝜆𝜆(1)𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)))
∑ exp(𝜆𝜆(1)𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈(𝑗𝑗)(𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗))9
𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)=0 . 
These probabilities form the vectors of choice probabilities on stage one  𝒑𝒑(𝑖𝑖)�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)� and 
𝒑𝒑(𝑗𝑗)�𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)� respectively. In equilibrium both players have to anticipate the probabilities of the 
other player. This means that player i has to calculate this expected utilities with the correctly 
anticipated vector 𝒑𝒑(𝑖𝑖)�𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)� and player j with the correctly anticipated 𝒑𝒑(𝑗𝑗)�𝑒𝑒(𝑗𝑗)�. 
Altogether on stage two player i has to anticipate the acceptance probabilities of player j on 
stage three. With these probabilities player i forms offer probabilities which have to be 
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anticipated by both players on stage one. Together with the correct anticipation of the other 
player’s effort probabilities this forms the logit equilibrium as stated by McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1995, 1996, 1998). 
4.3.4 The Utility Functions 
For the estimation I consider two different utility functions, each embedded in a logit 
equilibrium framework. The first specification is the standard utility function of egoistic 
players. In this case utility is equal to payoff and the utility function is given by 
𝑈𝑈�𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘)� = 𝜋𝜋(𝑘𝑘). 
The second specification uses the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999, henceforth FS) which is 
widely used to model other regarding preferences. In the FS model the utility of a player 
depends on his/her own payoff and the other player’s payoff. For two players f and g it can be 
described by the utility function 
𝑈𝑈(𝑓𝑓)�𝜋𝜋(𝑓𝑓),𝜋𝜋(𝑔𝑔)� = 𝜋𝜋(𝑓𝑓) − 𝛼𝛼(𝑓𝑓) max�0,𝜋𝜋(𝑔𝑔) −  𝜋𝜋(𝑓𝑓)� − 𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓) max (0,𝜋𝜋(𝑓𝑓) − 𝜋𝜋(𝑔𝑔)), 
with restrictions 𝛼𝛼(𝑓𝑓) ≥ 0,𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓)  ≥ 0 and 𝛼𝛼(𝑓𝑓) ≥ 𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓) . As can be seen, the utility of player f 
depends on his/her own payoff 𝜋𝜋(𝑓𝑓) and the payoff difference between the players weighted 
with parameters 𝛼𝛼(𝑓𝑓) and 𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓). Depending on the characterizing parameters 𝛼𝛼(𝑓𝑓)and 𝛽𝛽(𝑓𝑓)  
player f’s utility is reduced by favored or unfavored inequality between both players’ payoffs. 
4.3.5 The Likelihood Function 
To estimate the parameters of the utility function and the precision parameter 𝜆𝜆 one has to use 
maximum likelihood methods. The likelihood function is the product of all probabilities of all 
players on all stages. The link function is the above described logit error probability function 
which is the probability function of the underlying Extreme Value Type I cumulative 
distribution function. Thus the log likelihood function for all observed pairs of players 𝑡𝑡 ∈{1, … ,𝑛𝑛} becomes 
log 𝐿𝐿 = � log�𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)(𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖))� + log �𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)(𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗))� + log�𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)(𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖))� +
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡
(𝑗𝑗) ⋅ log �𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)(𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) = 1)� + (1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)) ⋅ log �𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗)(𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) = 0)�𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1  . 
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The log likelihood function can be evaluated with standard maximum likelihood methods. It 
is important to notice that the maximization process is restricted in the sense that only 
equilibrium choice probabilities enter the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
4.4 Estimation Results 
The calculation of the logit equilibrium and the maximization of the likelihood function are 
carried out with the statistical software R. The dataset contains 232 observations which are 
transformed in the way described above. Summary statistics of the modified data are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) 𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖) 𝑟𝑟(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)) 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖) 𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)/𝑟𝑟(𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)𝑒𝑒(𝑖𝑖)) 𝛿𝛿(𝑗𝑗)�𝑜𝑜(𝑖𝑖)� 
Mean 
S. Dev. 
6.26 
1.25 
6.59 
2.29 
427.77 
103.32 
199.71 
90.66 
0.45 
0.17 
0.86 
0.35 
Notes: Table 4.1 includes the efforts of player i and j (in columns 2 and 3), the return of the joint production 
(column 4), the offer of player i (column 5), the relative offer (column 6) and the acceptance decision of player j 
(column 7). 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the estimation of the two above described utility functions. 
Table 4.2: Results of the Maximum Likelihood Estimations 
 𝜆𝜆(1) 𝜆𝜆(2) 𝜆𝜆(3) 𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽 logL AIC BIC 
M1 0.000 
(0.013) 
0.061 
(0.016) 
0.117 
(0.013) 
- - -2617 5240 5251 
M2 0.125 
(0.027) 
2.000 
(0.097) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
0.881 
(0.009) 
-1616 3241 3258 
Notes: Table 4.2 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimation for the models M1 and M2. Standard 
errors are given in parenthesis.45 It includes further the value of the log likelihood function (logL), the Akaike- 
(AIC) and the Schwarz Bayes- (BIC) information criteria.46 
M1 is the model with egoistic preferences. To account for different levels of information in 
the different stages of the game I estimate different precision parameters for all stages. M2 is 
the model with social preferences. Here I estimate the precision parameters 𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠) for each 
45 The standard errors in M2 are approximated, since instead of the fisher information matrix the nearest positive 
definite matrix is used. This was necessary because a negative definite fisher information matrix was produced 
by the estimation. The approximation is proposed by e.g. Gill and King (2004) and Wothke (1993). 
46 The R code and the data used to estimate the free parameters of model M2 are attached in Appendix D. 
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stage 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {1,2,3} along with the inequality aversion parameters 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼(𝑗𝑗) and 𝛽𝛽 =
𝛽𝛽(𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽(𝑗𝑗).47 
The values of AIC and BIC clearly indicate a better fit of M2 compared to M1. Thus the FS 
model is better able to explain the data. Nevertheless some estimates of the parameters seem 
to be implausible which will be investigated in more detail below. 
The values of the precision parameters in M1 indicate substantial deviations from payoff 
maximizing behavior. All three values of 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 are close to zero indicating random behaviour of 
the players. It is plausible that 𝜆𝜆(1) < 𝜆𝜆(2) < 𝜆𝜆(3) since the uncertainty is higher in stage 1 in 
comparison to stage 2 and higher in stage 2 in comparison to stage 3. 
In M2 the parameters 𝜆𝜆(1) and 𝜆𝜆(3) indicate noisy behavior in stages 1 and 3. On the other 
hand the value of 𝜆𝜆(2) indicates behavior of player i in stage 2 that is close to utility 
maximization. The estimated 𝛼𝛼 parameter is zero which implies no unflavored inequality 
aversion for both players. This is in line with their effort decisions but implausible in general. 
The value for 𝛽𝛽 is very high. This is plausible and in line with the observed data because high 
values for 𝛽𝛽 imply high effort decisions and payoff equating offer decisions. It is, however, 
not satisfying that three out of five parameters lie on their bounds. 
The fit of model M2 is shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.48 Due to the complexity of the 
game on stage two and three I only present the effort decisions from stage one. The figures 
show the estimated effort probabilities for players i and j respectively and the true relative 
frequencies of effort decisions. The model fits fairly well but underestimates the modus of the 
effort decisions of player i and j. This is not surprising since some of the parameters lie on 
their bounds. The estimation shows that the FS Model is not the appropriate model for the 
game structure.  
47 Note that the estimation requires parameter restrictions. I use the restrictions 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽 ≤ 1, the usual 
restrictions of the FS Model. The restriction 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝛽𝛽 is not used. Furthermore I restrict the precision parameters 
to 0≤ 𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠) ≤ 2. The restriction is necessary to avoid numerical problems in the likelihood estimation 
procedure. Typically the precision parameter is restricted to 0 ≤ 𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠) only. 
48 Notice that for the calculation of the QRE probabilities the each parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is multiplied by 10 to reverse the 
downscaling. 
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Figure 4.1: QRE Prediction and Relative Frequencies of the Effort Decision of Player i 
 
Figure 4.2: QRE Prediction and Relative Frequencies of the Effort Decision of Player j 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
I present a logit error model for a three stage ultimatum game with advance production and 
estimate both a FS utility function and a standard egoistic payoff maximizing utility function. 
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation clearly indicate that the FS Model 
specification is preferable to the egoistic preferences specification. But the parameter 
estimates also indicate the limitation of the FS Model to this particular experiment. Without 
restricting the parameters the estimation procedure would produce negatives values for the 
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unfavored inequality aversion parameter 𝛼𝛼 (not reported). This is not in line with the 
assumptions of the FS Model because it would imply a utility gain from being paid worse 
than the other player. However this might be exactly the case in that experiment. Remember 
that player i is only half as productive as player j. Thus under several fairness conditions 
player i might wish to give player j two thirds of the joint production and keep only one third 
for himself/herself. Further on the necessity of numerous downscaling of the variables shows 
that the estimation of an logit equilibrium model is very sensitive to numerical problems as 
well as the estimation with complex “handmade” likelihood functions. 
A next step may be to check the validity of other utility functions within this experiment. It 
seems necessary to consider utility functions which incorporate the above mentioned fairness 
considerations that unequal payoffs are utility maximizing in the light of asymmetric 
productivities of both players. 
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Proposition 1.1: If the trustee (second mover in the trust game) is sufficiently 
inequality averse 4/1≥jβ  there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) with 
maximal investment and maximal backtransfer and with player P choosing sequence P-
First (voluntary leadership). 
Proof: Suppose that players` social preferences are described by the following utility function 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999): 
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with restrictions 10 <≤ jβ  and jj βα ≥ . Furthermore, we assume that the preference 
parameters are common knowledge. It is easy to see that utility is decreasing in iπ  if ij ππ < . 
Hence, in a SPE backtransfer will never exceed investment, and the trustee`s utility function 
can be reduced to )( 12222 ππβπ −−=U  with index 1 (2) referring to first (second) mover. 
Given the monetary payoff functions as described by the game rules (see above) and for 
21 yx ≥  the trustees’s utility is 
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Since this is a linear function, the trustee maximizes his/her utility at a corner solution. Hence, 
he/she either reciprocates by choosing 12 xy = which implies 12 210 xU += , or he/she chooses 
02 =y  which implies 2112 4310 βxxU −+= . Establishing 12 xy =  as equilibrium choice 
requires 2111 4310210 βxxx −+≥+  which is sitequivalent to 412 /≥β . 
Given the trustee’s equilibrium choice 12 xy =  the utility of the investor (first mover) is 
simply 12 210 xU += . Since this is increasing in 1x , the investor’s optimal choice is .101 =x  
This concludes that maximal investment and maximal backtransfer are SPE-choices. 
Regarding the choice of the sequence, player P is indifferent if 41/≥Aβ  and 41/≥Pβ . 
Player P strictly prefers P-First if 41/≥Aβ and 4/1≤Pβ .  
q.e.d. 
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Let e be the minimum endowment of 10 money units. Thus player P is endowed with 5e and 
player A with e respectively. 
Proposition 2.1: Regardless of the degree of inequality aversion of player A and the 
sequence chosen by P player A’s transfer is zero. 
Proof: The utility of player A is: 
𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴) =  𝑒𝑒 + 3𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 − 𝛼𝛼( 4𝑒𝑒 − 𝑥𝑥 + 3𝑦𝑦) = 3𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦 + 𝑒𝑒(1 − 4𝛼𝛼) − 𝛼𝛼3𝑦𝑦 
Now it’s easy to see that this utility decreases with 𝑦𝑦 > 0 regardless of all other variables. 
q.e.d. 
Proposition 2.2: If player P (the better endowed player) is sufficiently inequality averse (𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 > 1 4⁄ ) the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a full transfer of player P. Player 
A’s transfer is zero and player P is indifferent about the sequence. 
Proof:49 Player P’s utility according to the FS Model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) is: 
𝑈𝑈(𝑃𝑃) = 5𝑒𝑒 + 3𝑦𝑦 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛽𝛽(4𝑒𝑒 − 𝑥𝑥 − 3𝑥𝑥 + 3𝑦𝑦 + 𝑦𝑦) 
As we argue in Proposition 2.1 the amount sent by player A y is zero thus the utility becomes 
𝑈𝑈(𝑃𝑃) = 5𝑒𝑒 − 𝑥𝑥 − 𝛽𝛽(4𝑒𝑒 − 3𝑥𝑥 − 𝑥𝑥) = 5𝑒𝑒 − 𝛽𝛽4𝑒𝑒 − 𝑥𝑥 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑥𝑥. 
Now it’s easy to see that this utility increases in x if: 
𝛽𝛽 > 1 4⁄ . 
q.e.d. 
  
49 For a more formal proof of this proposition see the proof of Proposition 1.1. 
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Proposition 2.3: If one of the players invests an amount xl > 3, then the backtransfer of 
the other player is also positive if 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 > Δ𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙. 
Proof: The first part of Proposition 2.3 states that in our experiment an investment of three 
money units is necessary to produce a positive kindness term. This is easy to show. 
Remember that the kindness of player l is measured as: 
𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 = 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 − 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 
This means that the actual possible payoff of player k has to exceed the so called equitable 
payoff 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒. The equitable payoff is calculated as the mean of the maximum and the minimum 
possible payoffs for player k: 
𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘
𝑒𝑒 = 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘ℎ + 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘2  
Now consider either player A or player P of our experiment. The difference between both 
players is their initial endowment. Call Ek the non transferable endowment of both players 
(for 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃}). Remember that player A has no such endowment thus EA = 0 and for player 
P it is EP = 40. Additional both players are endowed with the transferable amount e = 10 for 
both players. The minimum payoff of any player is 
𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘 = 𝑒𝑒 + 0 ∗ 3 − 𝑒𝑒 + 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 
This payoff results from an investment of zero and full backtransfer. The maximum payoff of 
any player is 
𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘
ℎ = 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗ 3 + 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 
This payoff results from full investment and backtransfer of zero. The equitable payoff 
becomes 
𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘
𝑒𝑒 = 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 + 2𝑒𝑒 
which is 20 for player A and 40 for player P. The kindness term is positive if the actual 
possible payoff resulting from the investment decision of the other player exceeds the 
equitable payoff. The condition is 
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𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 > 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 
Substituting the expression for 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 yields 
𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑒 + 3𝑥𝑥 > 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 + 2𝑒𝑒 
The left hand side of the equation expresses the actual possible payoff of player k if he/she 
keeps the whole money. Thus it is the sum of the transferable und non transferable 
endowment and the investment x multiplied by 3. This inequality holds if 
𝑥𝑥 > 𝑒𝑒3 
Since e = 10 and only integers are allowed this is equivalent to x > 3.  
Consider now the utility function of the DK model (Dufwenberg and Kirschsteiger, 2004): 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 =  𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 + 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 
If player l invests an amount greater than three money units player k compares her utility from 
reciprocating in form of a backtranfer and not reciprocating. If player k doesn’t reciprocate 
her utility is simply the payoff: 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘
0 = 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘0 
Player k reciprocates with positive backtransfer if: 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 > 𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘0 
Substituting both utility functions yields: 
𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘 + 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 > 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘0 
Now it’s easy to see that the utility to reciprocate is larger than to choose backtransfer of zero 
since 
𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘 > 𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘0−𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 = Δ𝜋𝜋𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙. 
q.e.d. 
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Appendix B: Instructions 
Set of Experiments I (see Chapter 1) 
The set of experiments I consists of one main experiment M.1 and three side experiments S.1, 
S.2 and S.3. All instructions are translated from German. 
Experiment M.1 
General Instructions 
You are participating in various decision experiments. At the end you will be paid according 
to your performance. Thus, it is important that you understand the following instructions. 
First, you receive and read the instructions for experiment one. Instructions for other 
experiments will be provided on the computer screen. 
Within the experiments you can earn money depending on your decisions. Earnings will be 
added to your account while losses will be subtracted. In the end of the experiment your 
earnings will be paid in cash. Earnings are denoted by points. The conversion into euro will 
be announced in each experiment. 
Please note that during the experiments communication is not allowed. If you have any 
question, please raise your arm. All decisions are taken anonymously. No other participant 
will get to know your name or monetary payoff. 
Good luck! 
  
 79 
Exogenous Treatment of Experiment M.1 
The participants will be divided into groups with two persons in each group. They are called 
player A and B. Players are randomly assigned to their groups and types. Your type of player 
is displayed on screen. Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
10 points = 3 euro 
1) Each participant receives an endowment.  
a. Participant A receives 10 points 
b.  B receives 10 points 
2) Participant B transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant A. 
3) Participant A gains 3x, i.e. participant A receives three times the amount transferred by 
B. 
4) Participant A transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant B. 
5) Participant B gains 3y, i.e. participant B receives three times the transferred amount. 
6) The experiment is done. 
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Endogenous Treatment of Experiment M.1 
The participants will be divided into groups with two persons in each group. They are called 
player A and B. Players are randomly assigned to their groups and types. Your type of player 
is displayed on screen. Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
10 points = 3 euro 
1) Each participant receives an endowment.  
a. Participant A receives 10 points 
b. Participant B receives 10 points 
2) Participant B decides about the sequence of choices. There are two possible 
sequences. B-A or A-B. If B-A is chosen, the experiment continues as described in 3a) 
to 7a). If A-B is chosen, the experiment continues as described in 3b) to 7b). 
Sequence B-A 
3a) Participant B transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant A. 
4a) Participant A gains 3x, i.e. participant A receives three times the amount transferred by 
B. 
5a) Participant A transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant B. 
6a) Participant B gains 3y, i.e. participant B receives three times the transferred amount. 
7a) The experiment is done. 
Sequence A-B 
3b) Participant A transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant B. 
4b) Participant B gains 3x, i.e. participant B receives three times the amount transferred by 
participant A 
5b) Participant B transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant A. 
6b) Participant A gains 3y, i.e. participant A receives three times the amount transferred by 
participant B. 
7b) The experiment is done.  
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Side Experiment S.1  
Figure B 1: Z-Tree Screenshot of Elicitation of Unfavored Inequality Aversion 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of each column in every row. The procedure is as proposed by 
Danneberg et al. 2007. 
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Side Experiment S.2  
Figure B 2: Z-Tree Screenshot of Elicitation of Favored Inequality Aversion 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of each column in every row. The procedure is as proposed by 
Danneberg et al. 2007. 
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Side Experiment S.3 
Figure B 3: Z-Tree Screenshot of Elicitation of Risk Preferences 
 
Notes: Players have to decide upon one of two lotteries in every row. The procedure is as proposed by Holt and 
Laury (2002). 
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Set of Experiments II (see Chapter 2) 
The set of experiments II consists of one main experiment M.2 (see below) and three side 
experiments S.1, S.2 and S.3 (see above). All instructions are translated from German. 
Experiment M.2 
You are participating in various decision experiments. At the end you will be paid according 
to your performance. Thus, it is important that you understand the following instructions. 
First, you receive and read the instructions for experiment one. Instructions for other 
experiments will be provided on the computer screen. 
Within the experiments you can earn money depending on your decisions. Earnings will be 
added to your account while losses will be subtracted. In the end of the experiment your 
earnings will be paid in cash. Earnings are denoted by points. The conversion into euro will 
be announced in each experiment. 
Please note that during the experiments communication is not allowed. If you have any 
question, please raise your arm. All decisions are taken anonymously. No other participant 
will get to know your name or monetary payoff. 
Good luck! 
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Exogenous Treatment of Experiment M.2 
The participants will be divided into groups with two persons in each group. They are called 
player A and B. Players are randomly assigned to their groups and types. Your type of player 
is displayed on screen. Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
10 points = 3 euro 
3) Each participant receives an endowment.  
a. Participant A receives 10 points 
b.  B receives 50 points 
4) Participant B transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant A. 
5) Participant A gains 3x, i.e. participant A receives three times the amount transferred by 
B. 
6) Participant A transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant B. 
7) Participant B gains 3y, i.e. participant B receives three times the transferred amount. 
8) The experiment is done. 
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Endogenous Treatment Experiment M.2 
The participants will be divided into groups with two persons in each group. They are called 
player A and B. Players are randomly assigned to their groups and types. Your type of player 
is displayed on screen. Points are converted into euros according to the following rule: 
10 points = 3 euro 
1) Each participant receives an endowment.  
a. Participant A receives 10 points 
b. Participant B receives 50 points 
2) Participant B decides about the sequence of choices. There are two possible 
sequences. B-A or A-B. If B-A is chosen, the experiment continues as described in 3a) 
to 7a). If A-B is chosen, the experiment continues as described in 3b) to 7b). 
Sequence B-A 
3a) Participant B transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant A. 
4a) Participant A gains 3x, i.e. participant A receives three times the amount transferred by 
B. 
5a) Participant A transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant B. 
6a) Participant B gains 3y, i.e. participant B receives three times the transferred amount. 
7a) The experiment is done. 
Sequence A-B 
3b) Participant A transfers an amount x (0≤ x ≤ 10) to participant B. 
4b) Participant B gains 3x, i.e. participant B receives three times the amount transferred by 
participant A 
5b) Participant B transfers an amount y (0≤ y ≤ 10) to participant A. 
6b) Participant A gains 3y, i.e. participant A receives three times the amount transferred by 
participant B. 
7b) The experiment is done.  
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Set of Experiments III (see Chapter 3) 
The set of experiments II consists of one main experiment M.3 (see below) and three side 
experiments S.1, S.2 and S.3 (see above). All instructions are translated from German. 
Experiment M.3 
You are participating in two decision experiments. At the end you will be paid according to 
your performance. Therefore it is important, that you understand the following instructions. 
 
 
-Roll Assignment 
 
17 participants are taking part in the decision experiment 1. Each participant has one of three 
roles. One participant is of the type A (player A), eight participants are of the type B (player 
B) and eight participants are of the type C (player C). Your type is randomly determined at 
the beginning of the experiment and is displayed to you on your screen. Your type remains 
constant throughout the experiment and is shown on the top of the screen to remind you of 
your role assignment. 
 
-Payoff 
 
The experiment consists of several periods. During the experiment payoffs are measured in 
points and displayed on your account. At the beginning each participant’s account has an 
amount of 50 points. Profits are added to your account and losses are subtracted from your 
account. In the case of a negative account balance you continue to participate in the 
experiment. Due to profits you can again obtain a positive account balance. At the end your 
payoffs are converted into euro and paid to you in cash. If your account balance is negative at 
the end, you receive a payoff of 0 euro for experiment 1. The following rules apply to the 
conversion of points into euros:  
 
• For player B and C:  10 points    = 1 euro 
• For player A:  100 points  = 1 euro 
 
-Other Details 
 
Please note that during the experiment communication is not allowed. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand out of the cubicle. All decisions are made anonymously. No 
other participant will experience your name and your monetary payoff. 
 
Best of luck! 
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Experiment 1 consists of 10 periods and 17 players: one player of type A, eight players of 
type B and eight players of type C. 
 
 
Procedures for each period: 
 
1. Player A proposes a payment scheme for an individual project (Project I) and a 
payment scheme for a group project (Project II) which are announced to all players B 
and C. Payment scheme I determines the payoff for project I and consists of a return 
share I (percentage of the individual return) and a fixed wage I. Payment scheme II 
determines the payoff for project II and consists of a return share II (percentage of the 
group return) and a fixed wage II. 
 
2. Each player B or C decides whether he or she accepts payment scheme I, payment 
scheme II or neither of them. 
 
3.a. Participation in Project I 
Given a player B or C accepts the payment scheme I, he or she participates in project I 
(individual project) and chooses an investment level (0, 1, …, 10) with the 
corresponding investment costs (investment cost = 2* investment level). The chosen 
investment level determines the individual return (individual return = 3* investment 
level). 
Thus the following payoffs results: 
period payoff player B (C) = individual return * return share I 
 + fixed wage I 
 − investment costs 
 
period payoff player A = individual return * (100% - return 
share I) − fixed wage I 
This means: Player B (C) receives the agreed return share I of the individual return plus 
the fixed wage I minus the own investment costs. Player A receives the remaining return 
share of the individual return minus the fixed wage I.  
 
Displayed information to the players: Player B (C) is informed about individual return 
and own payoff for the particular period. Player A is informed about the number of 
players in individual projects. Additionally, he or she is informed about the sum of all 
individual returns and the sum of the payoffs from individual projects. 
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3.b. Participation in Project II 
Given that several players B or C accepted the payment scheme II, groups of 4 members 
are formed out of the players who want to participate in project II (group project). 
Group members can be of different types. The group composition is random. Redundant 
participants can’t participate in a group project. They are informed and can decide, 
whether to alternatively accept payment scheme I or not. If so, see point 3.a. If not, see 
point 3.c. 
Each of the four members of a group choose an investment level (0, 1, …, 10) with the 
corresponding investment costs (investment cost = 2 x investment level) without the 
knowledge of the other group members decisions. You will be informed about types of 
your group members (type B or type C ) before choosing investment level. The chosen 
individual investment level determines the individual return contribution for each group 
member.  
 
Individual return contribution of participant B = 2.5 * investment level 
Individual return contribution of participant C = 7.5 * investment level 
The sum of the four individual return contributions is the group return. 
Thus the following payoff results: 
period payoff player B (C) = group return * (return share II)/4 
 + fixed wage II 
 − investment costs 
 
period payoff player A = group return * (100% - return share II) 
−4 * fixed wage II 
This means: Each group member receives one fourth of the agreed share of the group 
return (return share II) plus the fixed wage II minus the own investment costs. 
Participant A receives the remaining share of the group return minus the four fixed 
wages. 
Displayed information to the players: Player B (C) is informed about the group return 
and own period payoff. Participant A is informed about the number of participants in 
group projects, the sum of all group returns and the sum of payoffs from group projects. 
 
3.c. No participation on a project 
Given a player B (C) has neither accepted payment scheme I nor payment scheme II, he 
or she participates in no investment project in this period and receives the payoff 0. 
 
Rules for the payment scheme: 
o The return share can equal 0%, 10%, …, or 100%.  
Return shares I and II can be different. 
o The fixed wage can equal -15, -14, …, 0, 1, … or 15.  
Fixed wages I and II can also be different.  
Within the given limitations return share and fixed wages can be arbitrary chosen. A positive 
fixed wage means a payment of player A to the respective player B (C). A negative fixed 
wage means a payment of a player B (C) to player A. 
 
End of a period and further periods 
After the investment decisions payoffs are calculated. The period ends. Your period payoff 
and your account balance are displayed to you. The next period starts according to the same 
rules. 
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Appendix C: Regression Tables 
Table C 1: Results of Tobit Regression on Dependent Variable Effort in GT 
Variable  Coefficient Robust Std. Error P-Value 
Asymmetric Team * TpFix-GT 0.323 0.141 0.023 
Asymmetric Team * Share GT 0.050 0.008 < 0.001 
Asymmetric Team * Average Team Productivity 0.071 0.028 0.012 
Asymmetric Team -7.779 1.167 < 0.001 
Low Team Productivity -3.555 1.210 0.012 
Period -0.262 0.057 < 0.001 
Constant 8.530 0.659 < 0.001 
Notes: Base category is symmetric team with productivity 7.5. The model statistics are N = 800 with p-value < 
0.001 and pseudo R² = 0.032. 
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Table C 2: Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression on Tasks Selection 
GT versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT 0.030 0.005 < 0.001 
Fix in GT 0.112 0.019 < 0.001 
Share in IT -0.025 0.006 < 0.001 
Fix in IT -0.148 0.022 < 0.001 
Share in GT * HT 0.014 0.008 0.073 
Fix in GT * HT 0.051 0.032 0.119 
Share in IT * HT -0.018 0.009 0.046 
Fix in IT * HT -0.070 0.039 0.077 
HT 0.804 0.785 0.306 
Alpha-High 0.504 0.193 0.009 
Alpha-Missing 0.269 0.233 0.247 
Beta-High 0.287 0.176 0.102 
Beta-Missing -0.364 0.284 0.200 
Period 0.237 0.097 0.014 
Period2 -0.016 0.008 0.052 
Constant -0.630 0.647 0.330 
Exit Option versus IT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
Share in GT 0.005 0.008 0.547 
Fix in GT -0.085 0.027 0.002 
Share in IT -0.024 0.011 0.028 
Fix in IT -0.245 0.040 < 0.001 
Share in GT * HT -0.014 0.011 0.175 
Fix in GT * HT -0.022 0.040 0.587 
Share in IT * HT 0.004 0.016 0.790 
Fix in IT * HT -0.042 0.061 0.494 
HT 0.662 1.137 0.561 
Alpha-High 0.856 0.400 0.032 
Alpha-Missing -0.132 0.590 0.824 
Beta-High 0.386 0.350 0.270 
Beta-Missing -1.376 0.599 0.022 
Period 0.380 0.231 0.100 
Period2 -0.018 0.017 0.284 
Constant -3.119 1.099 0.005 
Notes: The model statistics are N = 1440, p-value < 0.001, pseudo R² = 0.2523. 
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Appendix D: Code and Data 
R Code 
############QRE for an Ultimatum Game with Advance Production############# 
 
 
########################################   
### load libraries “stats” and “lmf” ##### 
######################################## 
 
library (stats) 
library (lmf) 
 
########################################   
###          functions               ### 
######################################## 
 
fun <- function(eu, euop, vv) 
{ 
    ret <- 0 
  
    for(i in 1 : max_deep) 
    { 
        if (euop[ip,ir,io]!=-Inf) 
        { 
            ret <- ret + exp(vv*eu[i])  
        } 
    } 
     
    return (ret)  
} 
 
fune <- function(ww, eu) 
{ 
    ret <- 0 
  
    for(i in 1 : length(eu)) 
    { 
        ret <- ret + exp(ww*eu[i]) 
    } 
     
    return (ret) 
} 
 
funl <- function(f, epopdeep, maxrpodeep, maxprodeep) 
{ 
    ret <- 0 
     
    for (i in 1: max_deep) 
    { 
        if(epopdeep[i] != -Inf) 
        { 
            ret <- ret + exp(f[2]*(epopdeep[i]-f[4]*maxrpodeep[i]-
f[5]*maxprodeep[i]))  
        } 
    } 
 
    return(ret) 
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} 
 
funpeAll <- function(f, own, otherown, ownother) 
{ 
    ret <- 0 
     
    for (i in 1: grenze) 
    { 
        ret <- ret + exp(f[1]* (own[i]-f[4]*otherown[i]-f[5]*ownother[i])) 
    } 
     
    return (ret) 
} 
 
fillMatrix <- function(sourcematrix) 
{ 
    ret <- array(0,c(grenze*grenze,max_deep)) 
     
    for(ie in 1: grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1: grenze) 
        { 
            ret[(ie-1)*grenze+ir,] <- sourcematrix[ie,ir,] 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (ret) 
} 
 
calcEffortProposer <- function(accept, payoff, cost) 
{ 
    effort <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (payoff[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & accept[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
                { 
                    effort[ip,ir,io]<- 
accept[ip,ir,io]*payoff[ip,ir,io]+(1-accept[ip,ir,io])*-cost[ip] 
                } 
                else  
                { 
                    effort[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                }            
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    return (effort) 
} 
 
calcEffortResponder <- function(accept, payoff, cost) 
{ 
    effort <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
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        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (payoff[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & accept[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
                { 
                    effort[ip,ir,io]<- 
accept[ip,ir,io]*payoff[ip,ir,io]+(1-accept[ip,ir,io])*-cost[ir] 
                } 
                else  
                { 
                    effort[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                }            
            } 
        } 
    } 
 
    return (effort) 
} 
 
calcUtilityAccept <- function(payoffOwn, payoffOther, a, b) 
{ 
    utility <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (payoffOwn[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & payoffOther[ip,ir,io] != 
-Inf) 
                { 
                    utility[ip,ir,io]<- payoffOwn[ip,ir,io]-
a*max(0,payoffOther[ip,ir,io]-payoffOwn[ip,ir,io])-
b*max(0,payoffOwn[ip,ir,io]-payoffOther[ip,ir,io])  
                }     
                else  
                { 
                    utility[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (utility) 
} 
 
calcUtilityDenyProposer <- function(payoffOwn, payoffOther, costOwn, 
costOther, a, b) 
{ 
    utility <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (payoffOwn[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & payoffOther[ip,ir,io] != 
-Inf) 
                { 
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                    utility[ip,ir,io]<- -costOwn[ip]-a*max(0,-
costOther[ir]+costOwn[ip])-b*max(0,-costOwn[ip]+costOther[ir]) 
                }     
                else  
                { 
                    utility[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (utility) 
} 
 
calcUtilityDenyResponder <- function(payoffOwn, payoffOther, costOwn, 
costOther, a, b) 
{ 
    utility <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (payoffOwn[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & payoffOther[ip,ir,io] != 
-Inf) 
                { 
                    utility[ip,ir,io]<- -costOwn[ir]-a*max(0,-
costOther[ip]+costOwn[ir])-b*max(0,-costOwn[ir]+costOther[ip])  
                }     
                else  
                { 
                    utility[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (utility) 
} 
 
calcAcceptProb <- function (ura, urd, uu) 
{ 
    accept <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
 
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (ura[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & urd[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
                { 
                    accept[ip,ir,io]<- 
exp(uu*(ura[ip,ir,io]))/(exp(uu*(ura[ip,ir,io]))+exp(uu*(urd[ip,ir,io])))  
                } 
                else  
                { 
                    accept[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                } 
            } 
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        } 
    } 
     
    return (accept) 
} 
 
calcMaxPayoffEffort <- function(payoff1, payoff2) 
{ 
    maxPayoff<- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        maxPayoff[ip]<- max(0,payoff1[ip]-payoff2[ip])        
    } 
     
    return(maxPayoff) 
} 
 
calcMaxOffer <- function(effort1, effort2) 
{ 
    maxOffer <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
 
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (effort1[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & effort2[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
                { 
                    maxOffer[ip,ir,io]<- max(0,effort1[ip,ir,io] - 
effort2[ip,ir,io])  
                } 
                else  
                { 
                    maxOffer[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                }            
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (maxOffer) 
} 
 
calcExpectedPayoff <- function(exOffer, probOffer) 
{ 
    expectedPayoff <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze)) 
 
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            payoff <- 0 
      
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            {   
                if (exOffer[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & probOffer[ip,ir,io] != -
Inf)  
                { 
                    payoff <- payoff + exOffer[ip,ir,io] * 
probOffer[ip,ir,io]  
                } 
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            } 
 
            expectedPayoff[ip,ir] <- payoff 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expectedPayoff) 
} 
 
calcExpUtility <- function(utilityAccept, utilityDeny, accept) 
{ 
    expectedUtility<- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
 
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (utilityAccept[ip,ir,io] != -Inf & utilityDeny[ip,ir,io] 
!= -Inf & accept[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
                { 
                    expectedUtility[ip,ir,io]<- 
accept[ip,ir,io]*utilityAccept[ip,ir,io]+(1-
accept[ip,ir,io])*utilityDeny[ip,ir,io]  
                } 
                else  
                { 
                    expectedUtility[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                }            
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expectedUtility) 
} 
 
calcProbOffer <- function(lambdaProb, expectedUtility) 
{ 
    probOffer<- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
 
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
            { 
                if (expectedUtility[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
                { 
                    probOffer[ip,ir,io]<- 
exp(lambdaProb*expectedUtility[ip,ir,io])/fun(expectedUtility[ip,ir,], 
expectedUtility, lambdaProb)  
                } 
                else  
                { 
                    probOffer[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
                } 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    return (probOffer) 
 98 
} 
 
calcExpPayoffVectorProposer <- function(expPayoff, pp) 
{ 
    expPayoffVector<- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            expPayoffVector[ip]<- expPayoffVector[ip] + expPayoff[ip,ir] * 
pp[ir]        
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expPayoffVector) 
} 
 
calcExpPayoffVectorProposerResponder <- function(expPayoff, pp) 
{ 
    expPayoffVector<- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            expPayoffVector[ir]<- expPayoffVector[ir] + expPayoff[ip,ir] * 
pp[ir]        
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expPayoffVector) 
} 
 
calcExpPayoffVectorResponder <- function(expPayoff, qq) 
{ 
    expPayoffVector<- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            expPayoffVector[ir]<- expPayoffVector[ir] + expPayoff[ip,ir] * 
qq[ip]        
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expPayoffVector) 
} 
 
calcExpPayoffVectorResponderProposer <- function(expPayoff, qq) 
{ 
    expPayoffVector<- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            expPayoffVector[ip]<- expPayoffVector[ip] + expPayoff[ip,ir] * 
qq[ip]        
        } 
    } 
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    return (expPayoffVector) 
} 
 
calcExpectedEffortProposer <- function(expUtility, p) 
{ 
    expEffort <- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            expEffort[ip]<- expEffort[ip] + expUtility[ip,ir] * p[ir]          
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expEffort) 
} 
 
calcExpectedEffortResponder <- function(expUtility, q) 
{ 
    expEffort <- seq(0,0,length=grenze) 
     
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            expEffort[ir]<- expEffort[ir] + expUtility[ip,ir] * q[ip]            
        } 
    } 
     
    return (expEffort) 
} 
 
############# likelihood function############################### 
 
### f[1] = lambda for both players on stage 1    (effort decision) 
### f[2] = lambda proposer on stage 2            (offer decision) 
### f[3] = lambda responder on stage 3           (acceptance decision) 
### f[4] = alpha 
### f[5] = beta 
 
################################################################ 
 
log.lik <- function(f) 
{ 
   logl<- 
    -1*sum( 
         d*((f[3]*(x-cres-f[4]*max(0,y-cprop-x+cres)-f[5]*max(0,x-cres-
y+cprop))) 
          -log(exp(f[3]*(x-cres-f[4]*max(0,y-cprop-x+cres)-f[5]*max(0,x-
cres-y+cprop)))+exp(f[3]*(-cres-f[4]*max(0,-cprop+cres)-f[5]*max(0,-
cres+cprop))))) 
         + 
         (1-d)*((f[3]*(-cres-f[4]*max(0,-cprop+cres)-f[5]*max(0,-
cres+cprop))) 
          -log(exp(f[3]*(x-cres-f[4]*max(0,y-cprop-x+cres)-f[5]*max(0,x-
cres-y+cprop)))+exp(f[3]*(-cres-f[4]*max(0,-cprop+cres)-f[5]*max(0,-
cres+cprop))))) 
         + 
         f[2]*(epop[ind[,c(1,2,3)]]-f[4]*maxrpo[ind[,c(1,2,3)]]-
f[5]*maxpro[ind[,c(1,2,3)]]) 
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          -
log(funl(f,epopdeep[ind[,4],],maxrpodeep[ind[,4],],maxprodeep[ind[,4],])) 
         + 
         f[1]* (epepi[ind[,1]]-f[4]*maxrpep[ind[,1]]-f[5]*maxprep[ind[,1]]) 
          -log(funpeAll(f, epepi, maxrpep, maxprep)) 
         + 
         f[1]* (eperi[ind[,2]]-f[4]*maxprer[ind[,2]]-f[5]*maxrper[ind[,2]]) 
           -log(funpeAll(f, eperi, maxprer,maxrper)) 
     ) 
} 
 
######################################## 
###            constants             ### 
########################################   
 
grenze <- 10 
max_deep<- 22*9+44*9+1 ###maximal elements in three dimensional arrays 
third dimension 
 
######################################## 
###       load and assign data       ### 
########################################   
 
A<-read.table(file="C:\\ultimatum.csv",sep=",",header=T) 
 
x<-A$x ######################### offer 
y<-A$y ######################### demand 
eprop<-A$effortprop ##############effort proposer 
eresp<-A$effortresp ################effort responder 
d<-A$d ######################### accept decision 
cres<-A$cres ##################### responders cost 
cprop<-A$cprop ################# proposers cost 
iprop<-A$iprop ################# proposers index 
iresp<-A$iresp ################# responders index 
ix<-A$ix ####################### offer index 
index<-A$index ################# index of reduced matrices 
 
######################################## 
###         starting values          ### 
########################################  
 
xx<-1 
yy<-1 
uu<-1 
vv<-0.1 
ww<-0.1 
 
######################################## 
###           variables              ### 
########################################  
 
ep<-c(0:9) ####effort proposer 
ep<-ep*0.1 
er<-c(0:9) ####effort responder 
er<-er*0.1 
cp<-c(0,15,22,26,30,39,53,76,111,161) ####costs for proposer 
cp<-cp*0.1 
cr<-cp ####costs for responder 
 
 
################### calculates the returns depending on all possible 
efforts ep and er 
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return_matrix <- array(0,c(grenze,grenze)) 
 
for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
{  
    for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
       return_matrix[ip,ir] <- 22*ep[ip]+44*er[ir] 
    }     
} 
 
#################### calculates all possible offers for all returns 
 
offer_matrix <- array(-Inf,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
 
for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
{ 
    for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
        {   
            if((io-1)*0.1 <= 22*ep[ip]+44*er[ir]) 
            { 
                offer_matrix[ip,ir,io] <- (io -1)*0.1  
            } 
        }     
    } 
} 
 
#################### calculates payments for proposer and responder under 
acceptance condition 
 
payp<- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
payr<- array(0,c(grenze,grenze,max_deep)) 
 
for(ip in 1 : grenze) 
{ 
    for(ir in 1 : grenze) 
    { 
        for(io in 1 : max_deep) 
        { 
            if (offer_matrix[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
            { 
                payp[ip,ir,io]<-return_matrix[ip,ir]-
offer_matrix[ip,ir,io]-cr[ip] 
            }  
            else  
            { 
                payp[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
            } 
            
            if (offer_matrix[ip,ir,io] != -Inf) 
            { 
                payr[ip,ir,io]<-offer_matrix[ip,ir,io]-cr[ir] 
            }  
            else  
            { 
                payr[ip,ir,io]<- -Inf 
            } 
        } 
    } 
} 
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#### indices 
 
ind<-cbind(iprop,iresp,ix,index) 
 
############################################### 
############ loop ############################# 
############################################### 
 
# loop counter - used to use starting values in initial loop 
round <- 0 
 
repeat{ 
 
    # only first time use starting values 
    if(round != 0) 
    { 
        xx<-out$par[4]         
        yy<-out$par[5]         
        uu<-out$par[3]*10         
        vv<-out$par[2]*10         
        ww<-out$par[1]*10 
    } 
     
    round <- round + 1 
 
    #################### calculates utilities for both players under accept 
and deny condition 
 
    upa <- calcUtilityAccept(payp, payr, xx, yy) 
    ura <- calcUtilityAccept(payr, payp, xx, yy) 
    upd <- calcUtilityDenyProposer(payp, payr, cp, cr, xx, yy) 
    urd <- calcUtilityDenyResponder(payp, payr, cr, cp, xx, yy) 
 
    ########################################  stage 3  
 
    #################### calculates accept probabilities of responder 
 
    acc <- calcAcceptProb(ura, urd, uu) 
 
    #################### expected payoff of any offer 
     
    epop <- calcEffortProposer(acc, payp, cp)  # calculates expected 
payoffs of offers for proposers 
    epor <- calcEffortResponder(acc, payr, cr) # calculates expected 
payoffs of offers for responder 
 
    #################### max of zero and expected payoff differences of any 
offers 
 
    maxpro <- calcMaxOffer(epop, epor) # proposer  - responder 
    maxrpo <- calcMaxOffer(epor, epop) # responder - proposer 
 
    ########################################  stage 2  
     
    euop <- calcExpUtility(upa, upd, acc) # calculates expected utilities 
of offers for proposers 
    poff <- calcProbOffer(vv, euop)       # calculates probabilities of 
offers 
     
    #################### expected payoffs for any efforts matrices 
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    epep <- calcExpectedPayoff(epop, poff) # expected payoff of effort for 
proposer matrix 
    eper <- calcExpectedPayoff(epor, poff) # expected payoff of effort for 
responder matrix 
     
    ########################################  stage 1 
     
    euep <- calcExpectedPayoff(euop, poff) # expected utility of effort for 
proposer matrix     
    euor <- calcExpUtility(ura, urd, acc)  # expected utility of offer for 
responder 
    euer <- calcExpectedPayoff(euor, poff) # expected utility of effort for 
responder matrix 
 
    #################### probabilities of effort for both players 
 
    ######## starting values of effort probabilities, equally distributed 
 
    p<-seq(1/grenze, 1/grenze, length=grenze) 
    q<-seq(1/grenze, 1/grenze, length=grenze) 
 
    ######## definition of qre probability vectors for effort 
 
    pp<-seq(0, 0, length=grenze) 
    qq<-seq(0, 0, length=grenze) 
 
    ######## numerator of qre probability, sums up 
    ######## loop until mutual convergence 
 
    repeat{ 
 
        ######## expected effort of other player 
 
        euepi<- calcExpectedEffortProposer(euep, p) 
        eueri<- calcExpectedEffortResponder(euer, q)         
 
        ######### qre response effort probabilies conditional on other 
players probabilities 
 
        for(i in 1 : grenze) 
        { 
            qq[i]<-exp(ww*(euepi[i]))/fune(ww, euepi) 
          
            pp[i]<-exp(ww*(eueri[i]))/fune(ww, eueri) 
        } 
 
        i<-abs(p-pp) 
        j<-abs(q-qq) 
        k<-j+i 
        l<-sum(k) 
        p<-pp 
        q<-qq 
 
        if(l<0.0000000001) 
        { 
            break 
        } 
    } 
 
    ########################################  expected payoff of effort 
vectors 
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    ######### expected payoff of proposer vector 
 
    epepi  <- calcExpPayoffVectorProposer(epep, pp)          ### expected 
payoff of proposer vector for proposers effort decision 
    eperpi <- calcExpPayoffVectorResponderProposer(epep, qq) ### expected 
payoff of proposer vector for responders effort decision 
 
    ######### expected payoff of responder vector 
 
    eperi  <- calcExpPayoffVectorResponder(eper, qq)         ### expected 
payoff of responder vector for responders effort decision 
    epepri <- calcExpPayoffVectorProposerResponder(eper, pp) ### expected 
payoff of responder vector for proposers effort decision 
     
    ########################################  max expected payoff 
differences for effort decisions 
 
    ######### expected payoff differences in proposers decision 
 
    maxprep <- calcMaxPayoffEffort(epepi, epepri) 
    maxrpep <- calcMaxPayoffEffort(epepri, epepi) 
     
    ######### expected payoff differences in responders decision 
 
    maxprer <- calcMaxPayoffEffort(eperpi, eperi) 
    maxrper <- calcMaxPayoffEffort(eperi, eperpi) 
     
    ########################################  likelihood estimation 
 
    ######### elements to be substituted into the likelihood function 
 
    epopdeep   <- fillMatrix(epop) 
    maxprodeep <- fillMatrix(maxpro) 
    maxrpodeep <- fillMatrix(maxrpo)     
     
    ######### optim calculation 
 
    out <- optim(c(ww/10,vv/10,uu/10,xx,yy), log.lik, method="L-BFGS-B", 
hessian=T, lower = c(0,0,0,0,0), upper = c(2,2,2,2,1)) 
 
     
 
    uuu<-out$par[3]*10 
    vvv<-out$par[2]*10 
    www<-out$par[1]*10 
    xxx<-out$par[4] 
    yyy<-out$par[5] 
 
    if(abs(uuu-uu)<0.001 & abs(vvv-vv)<0.001 & abs(www-ww)<0.001 & abs(xxx-
xx)<0.001 & abs(yyy-yy)<0.001) 
    { 
        break 
    } 
} 
 
#============= result ======================== 
print (out) 
 
OI<-solve(out$hessian) 
se<-sqrt(diag(OI)) 
se 
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print (pp) 
print (qq) 
 
A<-nearPD(OI, corr = FALSE, keepDiag = FALSE, do2eigen = TRUE, doSym = 
FALSE) 
se<-sqrt(diag(A)) 
se 
 
Data 
Please save data under the name “ultimatum.csv” in main directory C. 
effortprop,effortresp,return,x,y,d,cprop,cresp,iprop,iresp,ix,index 
0.6,0.4,30.8,9.8,21,1,5.3,3,7,5,99,54 
0.6,0.8,48.4,24.2,24.2,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,243,58 
0.5,0.9,50.6,20.6,30,1,3.9,16.1,6,10,207,49 
0.8,0.6,44,16.5,27.5,1,11.1,5.3,9,7,166,76 
0.6,0.8,48.4,11.7,36.7,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,118,58 
0.6,0.8,48.4,12.2,36.2,0,5.3,11.1,7,9,123,58 
0.6,0.8,48.4,13.9,34.5,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,140,58 
0.6,0.7,44,21.5,22.5,1,5.3,7.6,7,8,216,57 
0.6,0.8,48.4,13.8,34.6,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,139,58 
0.6,0.4,30.8,5.8,25,1,5.3,3,7,5,59,54 
0.6,0.7,44,9.8,34.2,1,5.3,7.6,7,8,99,57 
0.6,0.8,48.4,24.4,24,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,245,58 
0.6,0.7,44,11.3,32.7,1,5.3,7.6,7,8,114,57 
0.6,0.8,48.4,18.4,30,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,185,58 
0.6,0.8,48.4,29.2,19.2,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,293,58 
0.6,0.8,48.4,12.4,36,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,125,58 
0.6,0.6,39.6,5.7,33.9,1,5.3,5.3,7,7,58,56 
0.6,0.6,39.6,7.8,31.8,1,5.3,5.3,7,7,79,56 
0.6,0.4,30.8,5.4,25.4,0,5.3,3,7,5,55,54 
0.6,0.7,44,17,27,1,5.3,7.6,7,8,171,57 
0.6,0.8,48.4,12.4,36,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,125,58 
0.6,0,13.2,0.2,13,0,5.3,0,7,1,3,50 
0.6,0.4,30.8,13.8,17,1,5.3,3,7,5,139,54 
0.6,0.2,22,5.7,16.3,1,5.3,2.2,7,3,58,52 
0.6,0.8,48.4,18.4,30,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,185,58 
0.4,0.6,35.2,17.6,17.6,1,3,5.3,5,7,177,36 
0.6,0.8,48.4,6.5,41.9,1,5.3,11.1,7,9,66,58 
0.7,0.3,28.6,2.8,25.8,0,7.6,2.6,8,4,29,63 
0.7,0.8,50.6,25.6,25,1,7.6,11.1,8,9,257,68 
0.6,0.5,35.2,19.2,16,1,5.3,3.9,7,6,193,55 
0.4,0.9,48.4,41.6,6.8,1,3,16.1,5,10,417,39 
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